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IGRATORY DIVORCE has given rise to many legal questions. A
problem of a significance reaching far beyond the field of
divorce and touching upon the very foundation of the fed-
eral power to prescribe spatial limits to state jurisdiction in all fields of
legislation, adjudication and taxation has been raised by a recent case.'
In all its dealings with the problem of migratory divorce the Supreme
Court of the United States has so far maintained that for a state to have
jurisdiction to grant a divorce it is necessary that at least one of the
parties to the marriage be a resident of the state.' In cases of migratory
t Max Pam Professor of Comparative Law, University of Chicago.
'Alton v. Alton, 207 F. 2d 667 (C.A. 3d, 1953).
'Under Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906), the action for divorce had to be
brought in the state of matrimonial domicile, which, as a general rule, meant the state
in which both parties were domiciled. By the Court's decision in Williams v. North Caro-
lina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942), the requirement was relaxed so as to let it suffice that one of
the parties is a domiciliary of the state. That this requirement was still indispensable for a
decree of divorce to be entitled to full faith and credit in other states was pronounced in
Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945), and Rice v. Rice, 336 U.S. 674 (1949).
In three additional cases, Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948) ; Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S.
378 (1948) ; and Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951), it was held that the divorce
forum's finding of residence was unassailable in any other state when the defendant had
participated in the divorce proceedings. The requirement of a finding of residence by the
divorce court has not been affected, however, by these decisions.
While in the cases the jurisdictional requirement is usually expressed by the terms
"domicile" and "domiciliary," we shall use in this article the terms "residence" and "resi-
dent." At one time the terms domicile and residence referred to different concepts, as they
still do in English law. But in this country domicile has to all practical effects assumed
the sense of residence. It simply means that state in which the person in question has
established the center of his life with an intention to keep it there for an indefinite time.
The element of peculiar attachment and permanency which characterizes domicile in the
English sense, as well as most of the technicalities concerning loss and reacquisition of the
domicile of origin have disappeared from American law. Residence is still different, how-
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divorce it has thus been necessary for the plaintiff to swear that he is a
resident of the forum state, i.e., a person who has established himself in
the state with the intention to remain so established indefinitely. He, or
more frequently she, who so swears with the return ticket to the home
state in the wallet or handbag, commits perjury. Can a state remove this
"necessity of choice between bigamy and perjury"?3 Under the present
state of Supreme Court cases it can hardly be said that a decree of
divorce rendered by a state of which neither party is a resident is
entitled to faith and credit in other states.4 But if the parties are not
concerned and are content to have in their hands a paper certifying that
a divorce has been pronounced by a court of state X, would state X be
precluded by the Constitution of the United States from providing pro-
ceedings by which such a paper could be obtained? The state of Ala-
bama and the territory of the Virgin Islands have tried to provide such
proceedings, but their statutes were respectively held unconstitutional
by the Supreme Court of Alabama and the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit.5 The statute of the Virgin Islands was also held, by
the Supreme Court of the United States, to be ultra vires the legislative
powers of the territory, which by the Organic Act of 1936 had been
limited to "subjects of local application."' The statute which in terms
purported to open the divorce court of the territory to non-residents was
held to deal with a subject of other than local application. 7 This deci-
sion has, of course, not disposed of the problem of whether or not a
statute of this kind is invalid under the Constitution of the United
States if it is enacted by a state or by a territory whose legislative
powers are not by congressional legislation limited to subjects of local
application. Nor has any decision of the United States Supreme Court
dealt with the constitutionality of statutes such as that of New York in
which the courts of the state are declared to have jurisdiction to dis-
ever, from mere physical presence. For further justification of the elimination from Ameri-
can terminology of the term "domicile," see Rheinstein, Domicile as Jurisdictional Basis
of Divorce Decrees, 23 Conn. B. J. 280 (1949).
3 This pungent phrase is used by Mr. justice Clark in his dissenting opinion in Gran-
ville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1, 28 (1955).
'See authorities cited note 2 supra.
'Jennings v. Jennings, 251 Ala. 73, 36 So. 2d 236 (1948); Alton v. Alton, 207 F. 2d
667 (CA. 3d, 1953).
'49 Stat. 1811, 48 U.S.C.A. § 1405r (1952).
7 Granville-Smlth v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1 (1955). It will have to be seen
whether this decision will mean the end to the divorce business of the Virgin Islands,
or merely the resuscitation of the dilemma between bigamy and perjury.
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solve any marriage which has been concluded in New York irrespective
of where the parties reside at the time of the commencement of the
divorce proceedings, or the statute of New Mexico, under which a
decree of divorce can be granted to any member of the armed forces
who has been stationed in the state continuously for one year, even
though he may not be a resident." This problem requires an investiga-
tion of the general meaning of jurisdiction and the basis of the federal
power to declare the spatial limits to which state jurisdiction is subject.
Such limitations have been frequently asserted to exist, but the consti-
tutional basis of the federal power to determine such limitations has
never been fully clarified.
In our investigation of the problem we shall start with that case in
which the jurisdictional provisions of the divorce act of the Virgin
Islands were held to be incompatible with the Constitution of the
United States.9
On February 10, 1953, Mrs. Sonia Alton, who until then had been a
resident of Connecticut, arrived in the Virgin Islands, and exactly six
weeks and one day later filed there an action for divorce from her hus-
band upon the ground of "irreconcilable incompatibility of tempera-
ment."' ° The defendant husband, without leaving his home in Connec-
ticut, filed, through a Virgin Islands attorney, an entry of general
' Consult:
1) N.Y. Civil Practice Act Ann. § 1147. The statute was enacted some ninety years ago,
but does not seem to have been challenged until last year when it was held to be valid
by a trial court in David Zieseniss v. Zieseniss, 205 Misc. 836, 129 N.Y.S. 2d 649 (1954).
2) N.M. Stat. Ann. (1953) c. 22-7-1 (8). The statute was upheld by the Supreme Court
of New Mexico in an opinion in which its compatibility with the constitutional law of
the United States was not discussed. Wilson v. Wilson, 58 N.M. 411, 272 P. 2d 319 (1954).
'Alton v. Alton, 207 F. 2d 667 (C.A. 3d, 1953).
'o Section 8(7), Bill No. 14, 8th Legislative Assembly of the Virgin Islands, Sess. 1944.
Incompatibility of temperament existed as a ground for divorce in the Virgin Islands
before they were ceded to the United States by Denmark in 1917. Its role in Danish law
is discussed in Burch v. Burch, 195 F. 2d 799, 806 (C.A. 3d, 1952).
The notion that incompatibility of temperament should constitute a ground for divorce
was developed by the rationalist Natural Law school of the 17th and 18th centuries. Cf.
Erle, Die Ehe im Naturrecht des 17. Jahrhunderts (1952). The first country in which it
found legislative expression seems to have been Prussia, where in 1754 King Frederick II
issued an Edict allowing a marriage to be dissolved upon the unilateral application of one
party proving that there existed between the parties an insurmountable incompatibility
of temperament. The provision was taken over into the Prussian Code of 1794 (Allge-
meines Landrecht ffir die Preussischen Staaten §§ 670 et seq., II, 1) and remained in effect
until 31 December 1899, when the Prussian Code was replaced by a uniform Civil Code
for all Germany.
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appearance, waived service of summons, and neither contested the di-
vorce nor participated further in the proceedings. The commissioner to
whom the case was referred filed findings of fact and conclusions of law,
and recommended that the plaintiff be granted a divorce.
Jurisdiction was stated to exist under the following provisions of the
Divorce Act of the Virgin Islands:
Sec. 9 (a) . . . If the plaintiff is within the district at the time of the filing of
the complaint and has been continuously for six weeks immediately prior thereto,
this shall be prima facie evidence of domicile, and where the defendant has been
personally served within the district or enters a general appearance in the action,
then the court shall have jurisdiction of the action and of the parties thereto with-
out further reference to domicile or to the place where the marriage was solemnized
or the cause of action arose.11
In spite of this statute, the District Court for the Territory of the
Virgin Islands called upon the plaintiff to produce evidence as to her
having established her domicile in the Virgin Islands, and, when no such
evidence was produced, dismissed the action. Domicile of at least one
party to a divorce suit in the jurisdiction, the court held, is a require-
ment of federal constitutional law, which cannot be declared by statute
to be dispensable. A decree of divorce rendered under such a statute
would not be entitled to faith and credit in any other jurisdiction and
would be void in the forum itself. 2
In her appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, the
plaintiff attacked this reasoning and maintained that it was exclusively
within the power of the legislature of the forum to determine under
what circumstances and to what persons divorces should be granted by
its courts, that a divorce granted upon the basis of the forum's statute
would be valid within the forum, and that it would be irrelevant for the
validity of the decree within the forum whether or not faith and credit
would be given to the decree outside of the forum.
This argument was rejected by the Court in a four to three opinion
written by Judge Herbert Goodrich,' 3 upon the ground that, unless one
of the parties has his domicile in the forum, the rendering of a decree of
divorce would "conflict with the due process clause." For that reason
the decree would be void in the forum itself, could not have any faith
and credit elsewhere, and could not be rendered. Under this argumenta-
" Bill No. 55, Legislative Assembly of the Virgin Islands, passed May 19, 1953, approved
May 29, 1953. On the legislative history, see Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S.
1, 11 (1955).
"Alton v. Alton, 121 F. Supp. 878 (D. V.I., 1953).
"Alton v. Alton, 207 F. 2d 667 (C.A. 3d, 1953).
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tion, the spheres of the full faith and credit clause and the due process
clause coincide. A judgment which violates the due process clause is
void. Its recognition in other jurisdictions is not only not required but
not permissible. On the other hand, it appears to be assumed that every
judgment which is valid in the forum state must be given full faith and
credit in every other state. It is further assumed that a state's lack of
jurisdiction to render a particular judgment necessarily has its basis in
the due process clause so that every judgment rendered outside the
sphere of the forum's jurisdiction is necessarily void. 4
Are these propositions true? We shall assume that under the present
state of Supreme Court decisions a state has no jurisdiction to pro-
nounce a decree of divorce unless at least one party to the marriage has
his residence within that state. 5 But does it follow that the rendering
of a consent decree to parties neither of whom is a resident would "con-
flict with the due process clause"? This conclusion might be correct if
the due process clause in the 5th and 14th Amendments would read that
"no judgment shall be valid if it has been procured in any way other
than that of due process of law." But this is not the wording of the due
process clauses, which require that "no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law." Neither the clause of
the 5th Amendment nor that of the 14th is of any relevance unless it
can be said that some person has been, or would be, deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law. But who could allege to
have suffered such a deprivation by consequence of a decree of divorce
rendered in consonance with §9(a) of the Divorce Act of the Virgin
Islands? Certainly not the plaintiff; she has obtained that freedom
from the tie of marriage which she has sought to obtain. And the de-
fendant? By entering a general appearance and choosing not to defend
he has at least signified his acquiescence. He has certainly not been
deprived of his life. His liberty has been increased rather than taken
away from him. The marital status of which he has been freed can by
no stretch of the imagination be called property, and such property
incidents of marriage as dower or support which he may have lost have
not been taken from him "unduly." Even if he might subsequently come
to regret his acquiescence in the proceedings, he could not be heard
"The writ of certiorari for which Mrs. Alton had petitioned was granted by the Su-
preme Court, Alton v. Alton, 347 U.S. 911 (1954), but when, just before the date set for
hearing, Mr. Alton obtained a decree of divorce in Connecticut, the case was closed as
having become moot, Alton v. Alton, 347 U.S. 610 (1954).
'Authorities cited note 2 supra.
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with such a complaint. Who, we may thus ask, has been deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process of law?"0
So thoroughly have we grown accustomed simply to speak of "due
process" or "the due process clause" and their violation that we have
come to forget the full wording of the clause and to overlook the fact
that its application requires that some person be deprived of life, liberty
or property. The late Walter Wheeler Cook knew full well why he was
so insistent in his warnings against the use of elliptical language."
Judge Goodrich's opinion indicates that he must have felt uneasy
about the applicability of the due process clause to the Divorce Act of
the Virgin Islands. Having stated that "an attempt by another jurisdic-
tion [than that of the domicile] to affect the relation of a foreign
domiciliary is unconstitutional even though both parties are in court
and neither one raises the question," he continues as follows:
The question may well be asked as to what the lack of due process is. The de-
fendant is not complaining. Nevertheless, if the jurisdiction for divorce continues
to be based on domicile, as we think it does, we believe it to be lack of due process
for one state to take to itself the readjustment of domestic relations between those
domiciled elsewhere.' 8
Although the question is stated elliptically, we may, perhaps, inter-
pret this passage as indicating that the one who has been deprived of
something without due process of law is the state of which one or the
other of the parties to the marriage has been a resident. But has that
state been deprived of its life, liberty or property? Even if one might
say that the state of the residence has been deprived of its liberty to
apply its own law and policy to the marital problems of its residents,
it would be a novel application of the due process clause to extend its
protection to a state. The clause has always been understood to pro-
tect the individual against the state, but never to protect the state
against the individual. We can safely assume that the Court of Appeals
of the Third Circuit would not have held that the Divorce Act of the
Virgin Islands violates the due process clause if full attention had
been paid to the exact wording of that clause. But would the decision
have been necessarily different?
18 Compare Mr. justice Clark's dissenting opinion in Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith,
349 U.S. 1, 16 (1955): "[Nleither of the Granville-Smiths claim that they have been de-
prived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. While the State has an
interest in the marital relationship, certainly this interest does not come within the pro-
tection of the Due Process Clause." Ibid., at 26.
1 7The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, esp. chs. 8, 10 and 12 (1942).
- 207 F. 2d 667, 677 (C.A. 3d, 1953).
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Assuming that without residence of at least one party no jurisdiction
exists, could it be said that in absence of such residence a decree of
divorce would be void simply because of the lack of jurisdiction and
without any reference to the due process clause?19 Or should it have
been held that, in spite of the lack of jurisdiction, the decree would
be valid within the forum even though it would not be entitled to faith
and credit elsewhere? 20 The answer to these questions depends on
what we mean by lack of jurisdiction, and this question, in turn, raises
the problem of the basis of all the decisions by which territorial limits
have been set to the several states' powers to levy taxes, decide cases,
and regulate human conduct.
II
1. Territorial limits to state powers have been asserted by the
Supreme Court of the United States as well as by state courts and
learned authors of texts.
The problem presented itself first in connection with the territorial
limits of a state's judicial powers. Under the full faith and credit clause
of Article IV, Section 1, of the Constitution,2' and the Act of Congress
of 1790,22 enacted thereunder, each state must give full faith and credit
to the judgments of the courts of every other state. At an early date,
it was maintained and recognized that this provision could not be literal-
ly applied. A person who does not reside in state F1 owns property
there, for instance a blanket or a bedstead. Somebody who claims to
be a creditor opens proceedings there by attaching the property but
without personal service of process upon the alleged debtor. In default
proceedings the court of F, renders a judgment in personam, enforce-
ment of which is then sought in F2. In numerous cases enforcement
"
9 Such was the holding of the Supreme Court of Alabama in Jennings v. Jennings, 251
Ala. 73, 36 So. 2d 236 (1948) ; see p. 823 infra.
'In Sutton v. Leib, 188 F. 2d 766 (C.A. 7th, 1951), it was held by the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit that a decree of divorce rendered by a Nevada court in a case in
which Nevada had no jurisdiction, was nevertheless valid within the State of Nevada; see
p. 822 infra.
= "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and
judicial Proceedings of every other State."
-1 Stat. 93 (1827), U.S. Rev. Stat. § 905 (1875), U.S. Comp. Stat. 2431 (1916): "And
the said records and judicial proceedings . . . authenticated [as stated in the preceding
sentence], shall have such faith and credit given to them in every court within the United
States as they have by law or usage in the courts of the State from which they are taken."
The version presently in effect is that of Title 28, U.S. Code, § 1738, approved June 25,
1948. In this version, the word "acts" has been inserted before "records and judicial pro-
ceedings."
19ss1
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of such a judgment has been held not to be required by the full faith
and credit clause.3 In 1850 the Supreme Court of the United States, in
D'Arcy v. Ketchum,2 4 expressed its approval of this restrictive inter-
pretation of the full faith and credit clause. In 1877, it went further
and in Pennoyer v. Neff23 held that a judgment rendered against a
non-resident who had neither been personally served with process nor
had submitted to the proceedings could not be treated as a judgment
in personam even in the state by whose court it was rendered. A state
was held not to have jurisdiction to proceed in personam against such
a non-resident.
Also in early times, jurisdictional limitations upon state power came
to be maintained in connection with the very topic of divorce. Under
what circumstances must one state give faith and credit to a divorce
granted by the legislature or the court of another state? Here again, the
state courts refused to apply the full faith and credit clause literally. A
divorce was held to be entitled to faith and credit only if it was granted
by a state having jurisdiction,26 and again, this attitude of the state
' Such decisions were already rendered with reference to the full faith and credit clause
of the Articles of Confederation, Article 4, which read: "Full faith and credit shall be
given in each of these States to the acts, records and judicial proceedings of the courts
and magistrates of every other State." This provision was held not to apply to default
judgments in personam rendered against non-residents in Kibbe v. Kibbe, Kirby's Rep.
(Conn.) 119 (1786), and in Phelps v. Phelps, 1 Dall. (Pa.) 261, 264 (1788): The Massa-
chusetts proceedings, in which there was rendered the judgment sought to be enforced in
Pennsylvania, had been commenced by attaching a blanket allegedly belonging to the de-
fendant. The proceedings, begun by the attachment of a blanket or, as in Kilburn v. Wood-
worth, 5 Johns. (N.Y.) 37 (1809) of a bedstead, prominently figured as horrible prece-
dents in numerous later cases.
Under the domain of the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution, the following
cases were decided: Rogers v. Coleman, 3 Ky. (Hard.) 413, 415 (1808); Kilburn v.
Woodworth, 5 Johns. (N.Y.) 37, 41 (1809); Green v. Sarmiento, 1 Peters 74 (C.C., Pa.,
1810) (Bushrod Washington, J.); Fenton v. Garlick, 8 Johns. (N.Y.) 194, 197 (1811)
(the decision refers to a statute of N.Y., passed on 10 August, 1798, expressly declaring
void proceedings of the kind in question); Bartlet v. Knight, 1 Mass. 401, 404 (1805);
Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. 462, 468 (1813); Aldrich v. Kinney, 4 Conn. 380, 383 (1822);
Shumway v. Stillman, 4 Cow. (N.Y.) 292, 294 (1825); Dennison v. Hyde, 6 Conn. 508,
517 (1827); Hall v. Williams, 6 Pick. (Mass.) 232, 245 (1828); Miller v. Miller, I Bail.
(S.C.) 242, 248 (1829) ; Starbuck v. Murray, 5 Wend. (N.Y.) 148, 156 (1830) ; Shumway
v. Stilman, 6 Wend. (N.Y.) 447, 449, 453 (1831); Hall v. Williams, 10 Me. 79, 287
(1833); Wernag v. Pawling, 5 Gill & J. (Md.) 500, 507 (1833) (dictum); Whittier v.
Wendell, 7 N.H. 257 (1834); Wood v. Watkinson, 17 Conn. 500, 504 (1846); Pawling v.
Bird's Ex'r, 13 J.R. 192, 6 Wend. (N.Y.) 447, 453 n. (1816).
11 How. (U.S.) 165 (1850).
95 U.S. 714 (1877).
S46 such decisions are listed by Chief justice White in his opinion in Haddock v.
Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 586 n. (1906).
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courts was approved by the Supreme Court of the United States."7
After it had thus been recognized that the judicial power of the states
was limited territorially, the Supreme Court was invoked in numerous
cases to decide whether or not a state had judicial jurisdiction in a given
situation. Upon the basis of these decisions it is now possible to recog-
nize an elaborate set of rules by which the territorial limits of a state's
judicial jurisdiction are determined.18
From the middle of the 19th century on, the Supreme Court had to
deal with another kind of alleged territorial limitation of state power.
To what extent, if any, may a state levy a tax on property located out-
side of its territory? In the determination of these limits, the Court has
vacillated a great deal, but it has not hesitated to hold that in some
manner state power to tax is subject to territorial limits. 9
To what extent, if any, may a state regulate, by its law, conduct
which is carried on totally or partially outside of its boundaries? In
1897, it was held that the state of Louisiana could not by its statutes
prohibit its residents from concluding contracts of insurance outside of
the state." In 1913, the Court held that the state of South Carolina
' Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175 (1901) (ex parte divorce); Streitwolf v. Streitwolf, 181
U.S. 179 (1901) (ex parte divorce); Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14 (1903) (consent
divorce).
The existence of jurisdictional limits to grant divorces is recognized also in those de-
cisions in which the state granting the divorce was held to have acted within its juris-
diction, so that its decree was entitled to full faith and credit: Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall.
(U.S.) 108 (1869); Cheely v. Clayton, 110 U.S. 701, 705 (1884); Maynard v. Hill, 125
U.S. 190 (1888); Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155 (1901).
On the general problem of limits to state jurisdiction to grant divorces, see also the
dictum by Field, J., in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); the Report of the Com-
missioners of Massachusetts, accompanying the Statute of 1835, as cited by White, C. J.,
in Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 588 (1906) ; and the general discussion in Bishop's
Commentaries on the Law of Marriage and Divorce, Book II (1st ed., 1864).
' Divorce: Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906); Williams v. North Carolina,
317 U.S. 287 (1942); Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945); Rice v. Rice,
336 U.S. 674 (1949); see also Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32 (1938); Sherrer v. Sherrer,
334 U.S. 343 (1948); Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948); Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S.
581 (1951); Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126 (1951).
As to the limits upon other kinds of judicial jurisdiction, see Rest., Conflict of Laws
c. 4 (1934); 1 Beale, Conflict of Laws c. 4 (1935); Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 166 et seq.
(3d ed., 1949) ; Stumberg, Conflict of Laws 69 et seq. (2d ed., 1951).
" See Bruton, Cases on Taxation 59 et seq. (2d ed., 1949 revision) ; 1 Beale, Conflict of
Laws c. 4A (1935); Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 97 et seq. (3d ed., 1949).
'o Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897). See also New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head,
234 U.S. 149 (1914) ; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357 (1918) ; Aetna Life
Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266 U.S. 389 (1924); Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Delta
& Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143 (1933); John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Yates,
299 U.S. 178 (1936).
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could not impose damages upon a corporation for conduct which had
caused harm to another but was carried on outside of the state.' In
1932, it was decided that in a situation in which a workman employed
in state A to do work in states A and B was injured in B, the applica-
tion of the workman's compensation law of B was improper.3 2 There
have been additional cases dealing with the proper territorial limits of
the application of a state's substantive law. 3 While it is difficult to
recognize behind such cases a coherent pattern as to how these limits
are to be drawn,34 and while there are other decisions of the Court
which seem to indicate that the states are free to determine for them-
selves their choice of law rules,3" the fact remains that in a considerable
number of cases the Court has proceeded upon the assumption that
territorial limits are set to the regulatory power of each state.
Although the Supreme Court has not always used the term jurisdic-
tion in referring to these questions, it has become customary in legal
writing to treat the problems under this heading and thus to speak of
jurisdiction to act judicially, to tax, and to legislate.3 6 But what are the
bases for the rules by which such jurisdiction is held to be limited? In
this connection we must recognize that jurisdictional limits may be of
a twofold character: they may be imposed by a state or nation upon
itself, or they may be imposed upon it by a legal order higher than that
of the state or nation. By its own law the state of Illinois has limited
the jurisdiction of its courts to proceed in actions in personam to cases
in which service of process can be had upon the defendant either per-
sonally or by handing a summons to a member of his household."a Also
I Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542 (1914) ; see also Western Union
Telegraph Co. v. Chiles, 214 U.S. 274 (1909).
"Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
"See Stumberg, Conflict of Laws 54 (3d ed., 1951); Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 31
(3d ed., 1949); Cheatham, A Federal Nation and Conflict of Laws, 22 Rocky Mt. L.
Rev. 109 (1950); Rheinstein, Das Kollisionsrecht im System des Verfassungsrechts der
Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, 1 Festschrift fir Ernst Rabel 539 (1953).
"'Nowhere has the Court attempted, although faith and credit opinions have been
written by some of its boldest-thinking and clearest-speaking justices, to define stand-
ards.... Nor can I discern any consistent pattern or design into which the cases fit.
Indeed, I think it difficult to point to any field in which the Court has more completely
demonstrated or more candidly confessed the lack of guiding standards." Robert H. Jack-
son, Full Faith and Credit-the Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 Col. L. Rev. 1,
16 (1945).
"Kryger v. Wilson, 242 U.S. 171 (1916); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Mfg. Co., 313 U.S.
487 (1941); Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941).
Cf. authorities cited notes 28, 29 and 33 supra.
I11. Rev. Stat. (1948) c. 110, §§ 137, 138.
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by its own law the United States has limited the application of most,
although not all, its criminal statutes to acts committed within the
boundaries of the United States. 8 With such self-imposed limitations
of jurisdiction we are not concerned in this article. We shall rather deal
with those limits of jurisdiction which are said to be imposed upon the
several states of the Union in some way other than by their own respec-
tive laws. The statement of the rules by which such limitations of state
jurisdictions are defined will, of course, be sought in the Constitution of
the United States. Nowhere, however, in that document can we find any
clause which by clear words defines the territorial limits of state juris-
diction so as to apply to all the situations in question. Where, then, can
we find the source from which these limits are derived?
At the very outset it must be observed that no statement of territorial
limitation of state jurisdiction can be found in the text of the full faith
and credit clause. This clause simply says that "Full Faith and Credit
shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and Judicial
Proceedings of every other State." 9 As we have seen, the clause is not
being applied as it is written. In connection with judicial proceedings,
the restriction has been read into the text that the command of full
faith and credit does not apply unless the state in which the judicial
proceedings were carried on had jurisdiction to do so. But how do we
know whether that state had jurisdiction? The constitutional clause
does not tell us. Under the second sentence of the clause the Congress
appears to have the power to articulate the rules by which state juris-
diction is defined.40 But in the statutes which Congress has so far
enacted by virtue of the empowerment of the full faith and credit
clause of the Constitution,4 it has refrained from articulating any defi-
nitions of state jurisdiction. Yet, both state courts and the Supreme
Court of the United States have consistently proceeded upon the
assumption that judicial jurisdiction of the states is territorially limited,
that these limits are established somewhere in the law, and that, upon
' See Stimson, Conflict of Criminal Laws (1936).
'U.S. Constitution Art. 4, § 1.
I "And the Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts,
records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof." See W. W. Cook, The
Powers of Congress Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 28 Yale L. J. 421 (1919),
repr. The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws c. IV (1942); Robert H. Jack-
son, Full Faith and Credit-the Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 Col. L. Rev. 1,
21 (1945); W. W. Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution 541 (1953).
"Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 93 (1827) ; see authorities cited note 2 supra; Act of 1804, 2 Stat.
547 (1856), now 28 U.S.C.A. 1739 (1948).
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such legal basis, they can be articulated by the courts.42 Only upon this
assumption was it at all possible in a workable manner to apply the
full faith and credit clause to "judicial proceedings."
No generally workable approach has been elaborated, however, in
connection with the applicability of the full faith and credit clause to
the substantive law of the states. While it has been alleged repeatedly
that that clause compels each state to give full faith and credit to the
substantive law of every other,4" the Supreme Court has applied the
clause in this sense only in a small number of cases, which can all be
grouped under the following five headings. In a series of cases it has
been consistently held by the Court that in determining qpestions
arising out of the relationship between a fraternal benefit society and
its members, the full faith and credit clause requires all states to apply
the law of that state under which the fraternal benefit society has been
incorporated.44 In one case, the full faith and credit clause was used
to reach a result which was in other cases reached by means of the due
process clause of the 14th Amendment, viz., that of compelling a state
to decide controversies arising out of a contract of insurance under the
law of the state in which the contract was concluded.4 5 In two cases the
clause was used to compel a state to open its courts to actions for wrong-
ful death created by another state in which the death-causing accident
occurred.46 There is, furthermore, a group of cases in which it was held
I The only intimation that a particular jurisdictional limit on state power may not be
based upon legal principles which, although they require judicial articulation, are already
contained in the Constitution, may, perhaps, be found in the following passage of Mr.
justice Rutledge's dissenting opinion in Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 255
(1945): "The Constitution does not mention domicil. Nowhere does it posit the powers
of the states or the nation upon that amorphous, highly variable common-law conception.
judges have imported it."
"Cf. Jackson, op. cit. supra note 34; E. M. Dodd, Jr., The Power of the Supreme
Court to Review State Decisions in the Field of Conffict of Laws, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 533
(1926); Moore and Oglebay, The Supreme Court and Full Faith and Credit, 29 Va. L.
Rev. 557 (1943); Hilpert and Cooley, The Federal Constitution and the Choice of Law,
25 Wash. U.L.Q. 27 (1939) ; Crosskey, 1 Politics and the Constitution 542 (1953) ; Childs,
Full Faith and Credit: the Lawyer's Clause, 36 Ky. L.J. 30 (1947); Corwin, The Full
Faith and Credit Clause, 81 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 371 (1933); Costigan, Article IV, Section 1,
of the Constitution, 4 Col. L. Rev. 470 (1904); Page, Full Faith and Credit: the Dis-
carded Constitutional Provision, [1948] Wis. L. Rev. 261; Radin, The Authenticated Full
Faith and Credit Clause: Its History, 39 IDl. L. Rev. 1 (1944); Ross, Full Faith and
Credit in a Federal System, 20 Minn. L. Rev. 140 (1936).
"Supreme Council of the Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U.S. 531 (1915); Modem
Woodmen of America v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544 (1925); Sovereign Camp v. Bolin, 305 U.S.
66 (1938); Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947).
" John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936).
"Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951); First National Bank of Chicago v. United
Air Lines, 342 U.S. 396 (1952).
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that each state must enforce the liability of stockholders of a banking
corporation as established by the state of incorporation.47 In all the
cases of this last named group, the liability of the stockholders had
been established by a decree of a court of the state of incorporation.
The full faith and credit clause thus applied in its undoubted reference
to "judicial proceedings," 4 but, nevertheless, the Court spoke of the
faith and credit due not only to the judicial decree, but also to the
statute upon the basis of which the judicial decree was rendered.
Finally, there is the isolated case of Bradford Electric Power Co. v.
Clapper,"0 in which it was held that under the full faith and credit
clause, the federal District Court for New Hampshire had to apply the
Workmen's Compensation Law of Vermont rather than that of New
Hampshire to the claim of the widow of a lineman who resided in
Vermont, was employed by a Vermont corporation under a contract
made in Vermont, and was killed while working for the corporation in
New Hampshire. Beyond this narrow scope of situations, the Supreme
Court has not applied the full faith and credit clause to problems of
legislative jurisdiction.
This reluctance can be explained upon two grounds. First, it is not
certain whether or not the full faith and credit clause applies to sub-
stantive law at all. It is not clear what is meant by the command that
full faith and credit is to be given to the "public Acts [and] Records" of
each state in every other. What are the "public acts and records" of a
state? Good, indeed almost convincing, reasons have been adduced for
the fact that by "public acts" the framers of the full faith and credit
clause of the Constitution and of the Articles of Confederation, by
which it was preceded, meant to refer to state statutes.50 If this is cor-
rect, a puzzling problem seems to arise, viz. the problem of why faith
and credit is to be given to state law only insofar as it appears in the
form of statute law but not insofar as it appears as case law. Professor
Crosskey's argument that the cases in which a state's unwritten law is
expressed are referred to in the text of the full faith and credit clause
by the term "records" 5' has been doubted.52 The argument is thorough-
'Finney v. Gay, 189 U.S. 335 (1903); Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243 (1912);
Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629 (1935).
's Cf. Rheinstein, op. cit. supra note 33 at 561.
'p286 U.S. 145 (1932).
See Crosskey, op. cit. supra note 43. Ibid., at 546.
= Yntema, Review of Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution, 2 Am. J. Compar. L. 582,
586 (1953).
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ly plausible, however, that the fathers of the Constitution regarded the
Common Law of the several states as, indeed, a common law, i.e., a law
which was common to all.53 While its interpretation might well differ
among various courts, it would always be the same law which they
were trying to understand and apply, so that there would not exist any
need for commanding any state to give faith and credit to the common
law of any other. We shall see later in this article that the notion of
strictly separate and different common laws of the several states, which
is regarded as axiomatic by the Supreme Court in its decision in Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins, 4 was alien to those earlier generations whose
notions of the nature of the Common Law as a law common to all the
states had found apt expression in Judge Story's opinion in Swift v.
Tyson.55 The text of the full faith and credit clause would thus not seem
to stand in the way of applying the command of faith and credit to state
statutes or, perhaps, to all state substantive law. That the clause has
nevertheless not been generally applied in this way has its reason in
another fact, pointed out by Chief Justice Stone in Alaska Packers' Co.
v. Industrial Commission of California.56 If the clause were to be
applied literally in every case having contacts with two states, which-
ever of the two happens to be the forum would always have to apply the
law of the other.57 If, however, a third state happens to be the forum,
the clause would give it no guidance as to which of the two other states'
law is entitled to faith and credit. In the one case the clause would thus
require an absurd result and in the second none at all, unless it were
supplemented by a set of rules indicating which state has legislative
jurisdiction. Such a set of rules would be none other than a full-fledged
system of conflict of laws, which would thus, via the full faith and credit
'Cf. Crosskey, op. cit. supra note 43, in chapter XVIII. In his elaborate review of
Professor Crosskey's book [Ex parte Clio, 54 Col. L. Rev. 450 (1954)] Professor Goebel
tries to show that the thirteen colonies did not have a common customary law. To what
extent, if any, this assertion is correct, seems to reduce itself to a question of terminology.
Neither in the review nor in the other writings of Professor Goebel and his school can
there be found a refutation of the view that the makers of the Constitution regarded
the Common Law as a law which all states had in common. That it would, indeed, be
difficult to imagine that men of the late 18th century could have held any other view,
will, it is hoped, be apparent from what is said infra, at p. 814 et seq.; see also the review
of Goebel's review by Petro, 53 Mich. L. Rev. 312, 324 (1954).
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
16 Pet. (U.S.) 1 (1842). M 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1934).
"A rigid and literal enforcement of the full faith and credit clause, without regard to
the statute of the forum, would lead to the absurd result that, whenever the conflict
arises, the statute of each state must be enforced in the courts of the other, but cannot be
in its own." Ibid., at 547.
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clause, become a part of the Constitution of the United States. Such a
result would be viewed with dismay and would be difficult to reconcile
with those cases in which the Supreme Court has held that conflicts law
is state law, the alleged violation of which does not raise a federal con-
stitutional issue,58 and which is to be applied by federal courts in di-
versity of citizenship cases. 9 These cases cannot, of course, be recon-
ciled with those mentioned before in which it was held that the full faith
and credit clause is violated by the failure of a state in certain situations
to apply the statute of another state. The co-existence of these two sets
of conflicting decisions illustrates the uncertainty which presently exists
about the bases of jurisdictional rules.
If any search at all is made for the basis of these rules, it is at this
time predominantly found in the due process clause of the 14th Amend-
ment.10 This view has resulted in a retrenchment of the Supreme Court's
once bolder efforts to establish a full fledged system of jurisdictional
rules. During the second administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt, criti-
cism of the Court's hostility to social and New Deal legislation reached
such a pitch that the President proposed to change radically the compo-
sition of the Supreme Court, and the Court thus inevitably modified its
approach. 61 It did so by discarding the concept of substantive due
process, which it had so often used to reach its now abandoned results.
The same concept had also been used to furnish the basis of some of
the Court's jurisdictional holdings. When substantive due process was
branded as an insufficient basis for the Court's decisions on social legis-
lation and similar matters, it also appeared to be no longer usable in
jurisdiction cases. With respect to regulation of activities by substan-
tive law, it now became permissible to apply regulatory laws to activi-
ties which formerly would have been held to be "extra-territorial" and
thus outside of the sphere of jurisdiction.62 Limitations once established
Kryger v. Wilson, 242 U.S. 171 (1916).
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) ; Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S.
498 (1941).
' Compare Overton, State Decisions in Conflict of Laws and Review by the United
States Supreme Court under the Due Process Clause, 22 Ore. L. Rev. 109 (1943), and
writings cited note 33 supra.
GiRheinstein, op. cit. supra note 33 at 572; R. J. Harris, The Judicial Power of the
United States (1940); E. S. Corwin, Constitutional Revolution Ltd. (1941); R. Jackson,
The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy (1941); R. K. Carr, Democracy and the Supreme
Court (1936).
"Pink v. A.A.A. Highway Express, Inc., 314 U.S. 201 (1941); Hoopeston Canning Co.
v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313 (1943); Travelers Health Association v. Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
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on state jurisdiction to tax were also abandoned,63 and the lines by
which judicial jurisdiction had appeared to be firmly limited were
softened so as to make the limits of judicial jurisdiction appear to be
founded on that concept of procedural due process to which the Court
continued to adhere.6" In the tax field, the door was thus opened to over-
lapping taxation, and even in flagrant cases the Supreme Court refused
to interfere,65 apparently believing that after the explosion of the con-
cept of substantive due process, no basis was left for holding that the
taxing power of a state was subject to territorial limits. All the new
cases, it is true, were limited to the taxation of intangibles, and it is
significant that in spite of the Supreme Court's new latitude, no state
so far seems to have tried to impose a property tax upon tangibles
physically located outside of its boundaries.66 It is also significant that
on the same day on which it had rendered a decision radically freeing
the states from territorial limitations of their power to tax intangibles,6 7
the Court, as if nothing had happened, rendered another decision con-
tinuing its line of cases by which all states are held in matters concern-
ing fraternal benefit societies to apply exclusively the law of the state
where the association has been incorporated.68 Since in the latter case
no constitutional clause other than that of Article IV, Section 1, was
mentioned, the Court apparently remained unaware of the contradic-
tion of that decision with the one which it rendered in the tax case.
Unawareness of such contradiction is only possible, however, if one
regards the full faith and credit clause as capable of being applied with-
out a supplementary set of jurisdictional rules, which, as we have seen,
is not feasible.
See, especially, Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357 (1939) ; Graves v. Elliott, 307 U.S.
383 (1939); Graves v. Schmidlapp, 315 U.S. 657 (1942); State Tax Com. of Utah v.
Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174 (1942); Greenough v. Tax Assessors of Newport, 331 U.S. 486
(1947).
"International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); cf. Comment, 16 U. of
Chi. L. Rev. 523 (1949).
'See Hill v. Martin, 296 U.S. 393 (1935); Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302
U.S. 292 (1937); but see Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398 (1939); Consult Tweed and Sar-
gent, Death and Taxes are Certain-But What of Domicile, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 68 (1939).
"In Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194 (1905), the Supreme
Court emphatically confirmed the principle, expressed already in a constant line of earlier
cases, that no property tax could properly be levied upon tangible property (movable or
immovable) by any state other than that in which the property sought to be taxed is
physically located. It seems that so far no state has provoked litigation in which the con-
tinued validity of this principle could have been questioned.
I Greenough v. Tax Assessors of Newport, 331 U.S. 486 (1947).
'Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1941).
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The Supreme Court's retrenchment in connection with problems of
jurisdiction would, of course, have been necessary, if territorial limits
of state jurisdiction really have their basis in the due process clause of
the 14th Amendment. That this clause cannot be the basis is shown,
however, by two facts: jurisdictional limitations were held to exist long
before the 14th Amendment was adopted, and they were and still are
applied in cases of consent divorces, where nobody is being deprived of
life, liberty or property. Where then have the bases of these limitations
been found?
2. For many of the cases which antedate the 28th of July 1868, the
day on which the 14th Amendment became effective, that attitude is
characteristic which was expressed by Mr. Justice Field when, in the
Case of the State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds, he said:
Property lying beyond the jurisdiction of the State is not a subject upon which
her taxing power can be legitimately exercised. Indeed, it would seem that no
adjudication should be necessary to establish so obvious a proposition. The power
of taxation . .. is necessarily limited to . . . persons, property, and business ...
within her jurisdiction. 69
That the taxing power of a state is limited to objects situated within
its territory-this, indeed, is the meaning of jurisdiction as used by
Mr. Justice Field-is a self-evident proposition for which it is not nec-
essary to state any source or basis. The proposition, it seems, is not so
much a rule of law for which it would be necessary to state a source of
authority, but an immutable principle, of which, unfortunately, we are
not told whether it belongs to the realm of nature or of logic.
In this view that certain jurisdictional limitations are so obvious that
their pronouncement does not require the statement of any authority,
Mr. Justice Field did by no means stand alone. All those cases in which
the Supreme Court discussed the problem of alleged territorial limita-
tions of a state's taxing power before the enactment of the 14th Amend-
ment and the discovery that the due process clause might be used for
the purpose 0 were disposed of in this apodictical way.7' The only place
15 Wall. (U.S.) 300, 319 (1872).
7 The earliest case expressly referring to the due process clause of the 14th Amendment
as limiting a state's territorial jurisdiction to tax is Louisville and Jeffersonvifle Ferry Co.
v. Kentucky, 188 U.S. 385, 398 (1903) (Harlan, J.).
'Hays v. Pacific Mail S.S. Co., 17 How. (U.S.) 596, 598 (1854) (per Nelson, J.):
California's attempt to levy a property tax upon ships registered in New York was held
to be inadmissible. "[Tihe state of California had no jurisdiction over these vessels for
the purpose of taxation; they were not, properly, abiding within its limits, so as to become
incorporated with the other personal property of the state."
Railroad Co. v. Jackson, 7 Wall. (U.S.) 262, 267 (1868): Pennsylvania attempted to
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in which a slightly different note was sounded was Chief Justice White's
dissenting opinion in Adams Express Co. v. Ohio,7 2 where we find not
only an allusion to the fact that jurisdictional limitations are common
to all nations but, more particularly, a clear expression of the necessity
that in a federal union all member states must be subject to such limita-
tions as are required by the need for mutual accommodation.73
Apodictical statements to the effect that a state has no jurisdiction to,
or, more simply, "cannot" render a judgment in personam against a
non-resident defendant who has neither been personally served with
process nor consented to the proceedings, are contained in most of the
state court decisions74 which were rendered before the problem was laid
at rest by the United States Supreme Court's decisions in D'Arcy v.
Ketchum75 and Pennoyer v. Neff.76 In another group of such cases the
due process clause of the 14th Amendment is anticipated in a remark-
able way: the proceedings in which the sister state's judgment has been
rendered are so unfair that not even the full faith and credit clause of
tax the total interest payments on bonds issued by a railroad company owning track in
both Pennsylvania and Maryland. In holding such a tax inadmissible, Mr. Justice Nelson
said: "Now, it is apparent, if the State of Pennsylvania is at liberty to tax these bonds,
that, to the extent of this Maryland portion of the road, she is taxing property and inter-
ests beyond her jurisdiction."
St. Louis v. The Ferry Co., 11 Wall. (U.S.) 423, 429-30 (1870): attempt by Missouri to
levy a tax on ferry boats having their home port on the Illinois side of the Mississippi
River was held unconstitutional, since the ships do not have their situs in Missouri (per
Swayne, J.). Morgan v. Parham, 16 Wall. (U.S.) 472 (1872): a ship cannot be taxed by
any state other than that of the home port.
In Adams Express Co. v. Ohio, 165 U.S. 194 (1897), a state tax on a part of the rolling
stock of an express company was upheld with the simple statement that "the property
taxed has its actual situs in the state and is, therefore, subject to the taxation."
'Z 165 U.S. 194, 230: "It is elementary that the taxing power of one government cannot
be lawfully exerted over property not within its jurisdiction or territory and within the
jurisdiction and territory of another. The attempted exercise of such power would be a
clear usurpation of authority, and involve a denial of the most obvious conceptions of
government. This rule, common to all jurisdictions, is particularly applicable to the
several States of the Union, as they are by the Constitution confined within the orbit of
their lawful authority, which they cannot transcend without destroying the legitimate
powers of each other, and, therefore, without violating the Constitution of the United
States."
' Simply apodictical statements are given in the treatises on taxation: Burroughs 40
(1877) ; 18 Cooley 55 (2d ed., 1886); and 19 Judson 482 (2d ed., 1917); cf. Bruton,
Cases and Materials on Taxation 59 (2d ed., 1949 rev.).
' Fenton v. Garlick, 8 Johns. (N.Y.) 194, 197 (1811) ; Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. 462, 468
(1813); Shumway v. Stillman, 4 Cow. (N.Y.) 292, 294 (1825); Miller v. Miller, 1 Bail.
(S.C.) 242, 248 (1829); Shumway v. Stillman, 6 Wend. (N.Y.) 447, 449, 453 (1831);
Hall v. Williams, 10 Me. 78, 287 (1833) ; Wernwag v. Pawling, 5 Gill & J. (Md.) 500, 507
(1833); Whittier v. Wendell, 7 N.H. 257 (1834); Wood v. Watkinson, 17 Conn. 500
(1846).
' 11 How. (U.S.) 165 (1850). 7895 U.S. 714 (1877).
CONSTITUTIONAL BASES OF JURISDICTION
the Articles of Confederation or the Constitution can be regarded as
demanding enforcement of the judgment." That proceedings of the
kind in question are not only unfair but also against the Law of Nations
is expressly stated in several decisions, of which Piquet v. Swan s is
remarkable because it was rendered by Mr. Justice Story, sitting as
circuit judge. The same argument was then used by the Supreme Court
of the United States in those two decisions in which it authoritatively
settled the problem.
In 1848, the Supreme Court of Georgia held that an action in per-
sonam against a resident of South Carolina could not be brought in
Georgia, expressing itself as follows:
You cannot bring a foreigner into the courts of Georgia, to answer to a proceeding
against him personally, without his consent. Against it lies an absolute prohibition,
found in the rights of sovereignty, and sanctioned by the usage of the civilized
States of the world.7 9
In D'Arcy v. Ketchum, it was held by the United States Supreme
Court that full faith and credit was not due to a New York judgment
Kibbe v. Kibbe, Kirby's Rep. (Conn.) 119 (1786); Phelps v. Holker, 1 Dall. (Pa.)
261, 264 (1788) (McKean C. J.: "The Articles of Confederation must not be construed to
work such evident mischief and injustice, as are contained in the doctrine urged for the
plaintiff."); Rogers v. Coleman, 3 Ky. (Hard.) 413, 415 (1808); Kilburn v. Woodworth,
5 Johns. (N.Y.) 37, 41 (1809); Green v. Sarmiento, 1 Peters C.C.R. 74, 3 W.C.C.R. 17
(1810) (dictum by Bushrod Washington, J.: To render a judgment against a person
who has not been given a fair chance to be heard, would be "an outrage upon the im-
mutable dictates of justice."); Aldrich v. Kinney, 4 Conn. 380, 383 (1822) ("A more
preposterous proposition cannot be advanced, one more contrary to reason and justice;
more injurious to the absolute rights of man, or to fundamental principle; than that a
person shall be invincibly bound, by a judgment, obtained against him without notice.
Audi alteram partem."); Dennison v. Hyde, 6 Conn. 508 (1827); Hall v. Williams, 6 Pick.
(Mass.) 232 (1828) (Parker, C. J.: "[i1t is manifestly against first principles, that a man
should be condemned, either criminally or civilly, without an opportunity to be heard in
his defence."); Starbuck v. Murray, 5 Wend. (N.Y.) 148, 156 (1830) ("against natural
justice").
Of interest also is the dissenting opinion delivered by judge Livingston in Hitchcock
v. Aicken, 1 Canes (N.Y.) 460, 472 (1803). Against the opinion of the Court that in
spite of the full faith and credit clause, the judgment of a sister state constituted no more
than a rebuttable presumption of its correctness, Livingston, J., argued that a sister state
judgment was not open to inquiry as to correctness. As against the Court's argument that
the possibility of a new inquiry had to be left open in order to prevent the enforcement
of a sister state judgment rendered without jurisdiction, Livingston, J., has this to say:
"Let a law be ever so plain, cases must and will happen which were not foreseen, or would
have been provided for; the courts must then determine, according to the reason and
spirit of the provisions, whether they include the particular subject before them. These are
the cases, which lex non exacte definit, sed arbitrio boni vri permittit." The problem was
settled in judge Livingston's sense in Mills v. Duryee, 7 Cranch (U.S.) 481 (1813).
'5 Mason 35 (1828). Admission in Massachusetts of an action in personam against a
resident of France would imply "a usurpation of foreign sovereignty, not justified or
acknowledged by the law of nations."
I Dearing v. The Bank of Charleston, 5 Ga. 497 (1848).
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rendered against a resident of Louisiana who had neither been personal-
ly served with process in New York nor entered an appearance or other-
wise consented to the proceedings. Referring to the state court decisions
which had denied faith and credit to sister state judgments rendered
under similar circumstances, Mr. Justice Catron said:
[Iln so holding they have altogether disregarded, as inapplicable, the Constitution
and laws of the United States regarding full faith and credit. We deem it to be
free from controversy that these state adjudications are in conformity to the well-
established rules of international law regulating governments foreign to each other;
and this raises the question, whether [the full faith and credit clause of] our
federal Constitution and the act of Congress founded on it have altered the rule.80
This question is then answered with a clear "no."
In Hall v. Lanning,81 D'Arcy v. Ketchum was expressly referred to as
holding that the scope of the full faith and credit clause is limited '"y
a rule of international law."
Finally, in Pennoyer v. Neff, 2 the Court stated that an Oregon
statute, applied as authorizing an in personam action against a resident
of California, constituted an illegal invasion of the sovereignty of
California "in view of those rules of international law respecting the
jurisdiction of an independent state over persons and property." Analo-
gous lines of argumentation are encountered in those discussions in
which a state's jurisdiction, through its legislature or its courts, to
grant divorces is held to be limited to persons residing within it. The
proposition is either stated apodictically"3 or derived from the law or
' 11 How. (U.S.) 165, 174 (1850).
-91 U.S. 160, 168 (1875). 895 U.S. 714 (1877).
'Jurisdiction to grant divorces apodictically stated to be limited to residents: Bradshaw
v. Heath, 13 Wend. (N.Y.) 407 (1835); Ditson v. Ditson, 4 R. I. 87, 101 (1856) (Ames,
C. J.: "It is obvious that marriage, as a domestic relation, . . .gives rights and imposes
duties and restrictions upon the parties to it, affecting their social and moral condition, of
the measure of which every civilized State, and certainly every State of this Union, is the
sole judge so far as its own citizens or subjects are concerned ... ; that a State cannot
be deprived ... of its sovereign power to regulate the status of its own domiciled subjects
and citizens.., by virtue of its inherent power of its own citizens and subjects.") (italics
supplied); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734 (1877) (dictum by Field, J.: "To prevent
any misapplication of the views expressed in this opinion, it is proper to observe that we
do not mean to assert, by anything we have said, that a State may not authorize pro-
ceedings to determine the status of one of its citizens towards a non-resident, which would
be binding within the State, though made without service of process or personal notice to
the non-resident. The jurisdiction which every State possesses to determine the civil status
and capacities of all its inhabitants involves authority to prescribe the conditions on
which proceedings affecting them may be commenced and carried on within its territory.
The State, for example, has absolute right to prescribe the conditions upon which the
marriage relation between its own citizens shall be created, and the causes for which it
may be dissolved ... 2 Bish. Marr. & Div. §156."); Cheely v. Clayton, 110 U.S. 701, 705
(1884) ("The courts of the State of the domicil of the parties doubtless has jurisdiction
to decree a divorce in accordance with its laws.") (italics supplied); Maynard v. Hill, 125
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the comity of nations.84 The notion of due process of law is not applied
except to justify the alleged injustice of recognizing the power of the
state of residence of one party to grant an ex parte divorce against a
non-resident defendant. 85 The idea that the due process clause of the
14th Amendment could stand in the way of a consent divorce appears
for the first time in Alton v. Alton, 6 the case which constitutes the
starting point of this article.
In these as in the other situations just presented the two lines of
argumentation do not stand in any way in contrast to each other. As
a matter of fact, in both lines of argument the limitation of a state's
jurisdiction to property and persons within it is derived from the con-
cept of sovereignty.87 If one state oversteps the limits of its sovereignty,
U.S. 190 (1888) ("the recognized power of a government to deal with its own citizens") ;
Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155, 163 (1901) (reference to the statement made by Field,
J. in Pennoyer v. Neff, and quoted above); Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175, 177 (1901) ("No
valid divorce ... can be decreed on constructive service by the courts of a state in which
neither party is domiciled"); Streitwolf v. Streitwolf, 181 U.S. 179 (1901); Andrews v.
Andrews, 188 U.S. 14 (1903). (In holding constitutional the Massachusetts statute by
which out-of-state divorces of residents of Massachusetts are declared invalid, White, C. J.,
expressed himself as follows: "The Statute in question was but the exercise of an essen-
tial attribute of government, to dispute the possession of which would be to deny the
authority of the State of Massachusetts to legislate over a subject inherently domestic in
its nature." On the general problem of the full faith and credit clause, White said, at p.
34: "Although a particular provision of the Constitution may seemingly be applicable, its
controlling effect is limited by the essential nature of the powers of government reserved
to the States when the Constitution was adopted.") (italics supplied); Haddock v. Had-
dock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906) (White, C. J., again spoke, on p. 569, of the "inherent power
which all governments must possess over the marriage relation . . . as regards their own
citizens.") (italics supplied); Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298 (1942) (Doug-
las, J.: "Each state as a sovereign has a rightful and legitimate concern in the marital
status of persons domiciled within its borders.") (italics supplied).
1 Limitation of divorce jurisdiction to residents expressly deprived from comity or Law
of Nations: Borden v. Fitch, 15 Johns. (N.Y.) 121, 143, 144 (1818) (The alleged juris-
diction of Vermont cannot be justified "by any principles of comity which have been
known to prevail in the intercourse of civilized states."); Report of Commissioners on
Massachusetts statute of 1835, Pt. II, p. 123, cited by White, C. J., in Haddock v.
Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 588 (1906): "This is founded on the rule established by the com-
ity of all civilized nations, and is proposed merely that no doubt should arise on a question
so interesting and important as this sometimes may be." jurisdictional limitations upon
a state's power to grant divorces are elaborately and explicitly based upon the Law of
Nations by Joel Bishop in his Treatise on Marriage and Divorce Book IX (1st ed., 1864),
the 7th chapter of which is entitled "The distinction between the jurisdiction by statu-
tory command and under international rule."
'Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906) ; dissenting opinion of Jackson, J., in Wil-
liams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 316 (1942).
'121 F. Supp. 878 (D. V.I., 1953); 207 F. 2d 667 (C.A. 3d, 1953).
1 Consult especially Adams Express Co. v. Ohio, 165 U.S. 194 (1897); Ditson v. Ditson,
4 R. I. 87 (1856); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190
(1888); Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906).
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it necessarily infringes upon that of another, and thus violates the Law
of Nations by which respect is demanded of each state for the sovereign-
ty of every other. We thus reach the conclusion that, insofar as juris-
dictional limitations are not based upon notions of fairness and due
process, they are founded upon certain principles of the Law of Na-
tions. By virtue of the Law of Nations, the territorial jurisdiction of
each state is limited and these limitations of the Law of Nations must
be regarded as being implied in the full faith and credit clause of the
Constitution of the United States. It must thus be read as requiring
that:
Full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts of such other
State as under the Law of Nations has jurisdiction to legislate on the matter in
question.
Full faith and credit shall also be given in each State to the judicial proceedings
of such other State as under the Law of Nations has had jurisdiction to proceed
judicially.88
III
The view just presented, i.e., the view that territorial jurisdiction
of the states of the Union is determined by rules of the Law of Nations,
and that the constitutional requirement of full faith and credit is
limited by these jurisdictional rules of the Law of Nations, is likely
to encounter two objections. It may be asked, first, what the Law of
Nations has to do with the relations between the states of a federal
union, which, by virtue of their membership in the Union, are not
sovereign nations; and it may be asked, second, whether the Law of
Nations contains within its body any rules at all by which limits may
be set to the jurisdiction of the several members of the community of
nations. It will be advisable to begin with the second of these two objec-
tions; as we proceed to discuss it, we shall, as it will turn out, also find
the answer to the first.
1. The Law of Nations or, as we now mostly say, International
Law, is based upon the principle of sovereignty, and it is the very nature
of sovereignty that a nation's freedom of action is not limited except
by some rule of the Law of Nations. Where no such rule exists, a na-
tion may by its own law limit its, or more correctly, its officers', free-
dom of action, but such self-limitation can at any time be shaken off
' This formulation is, in substance, the same as that of Professor Crosskey, who cir-
cumscribes the meaning of the first sentence of the full faith and credit clause as follows:
"Full effect shall be given, in each state, to the legislation, judicial precedents, and decrees,
of every other state, as will answer, in every respect, to what is required by the rules and
principles of the conflict of laws." Op. cit. supra note 40, at 550.
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by the nation itself. Does International Law then contain rules by
which the several nations' legislative, judicial and administrative juris-
dictions are limited against each other? At present it seems that no
limitations are generally recognized beyond one which is contained in
the principle that no nation's officer is allowed to engage in the exer-
cise of state power within the territory of another.8 9 The United States
would violate International Law if the sheriff of a state would try to
make an arrest upon Canadian soil, or if an American consul in Switzer-
land would conduct upon Swiss soil a hearing to examine a witness for
purposes of a law suit pending before an American court.9" But Inter-
national Law is in no way violated when a court of the United States
tries on American soil a citizen of the United States who, while abroad,
has refused to come home to testify9' or to pay taxes, or who has com-
mitted an act of treason against the United States.92 Turkey has been
held by the Permanent Court of International Justice not to have vio-
lated International Law when, in Turkey, Turkish officials arrested,
tried and imprisoned a French citizen who had caused the death of
several citizens of Turkey by acts of negligence committed upon the
high seas.93 An American occupation court exercising German state
power has tried and sent to prison a citizen of Czechoslovakia who had
mistreated citizens of Germany, Czechoslovakia, and other nations, and
thus brought himself under a German law which threatens with
punishment anyone committing such acts both inside and outside of
Germany.94 None of these "extraterritorial" exercises of state power
' For a survey of the literature, see Harvard Research in International Law, jurisdic-
tion over Crime, 29 Am. J. Int. L., Supp. 439 (1935); Moore's Digest of International
Law §§ 175, 537 (1906); Hyde, International Law §§ 220, 244 (2d rev. ed., 1945);
Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch (U.S.) 116 (1812).
,1 Cf. Jones, International Judicial Assistance: Procedural Chaos and a Program for
Reform, 62 Yale L.J. 515 (1953).
" Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932).
" 18 U.S. Code § 1 provides that "whoever, owing allegiance to the United States, levies
war against them or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the
United States or elsewhere, is guilty of treason." This statute was applied to acts com-
mitted abroad in U.S. v. Chandler, 72 F. Supp. 230 (D. Mass., 1947), 171 F. 2d 921
(C.A. 1st, 1948); U.S. v. Best, 76 F. Supp. 138 (D. Mass., 1948), 184 F. 2d 131 (C.A.
1st, 1950); and Gillars v. U.S., 182 F. 2d 962 (C.A. D.C., 1950).
" Case of the S. S. Lotus, Publications of the Permanent Court of International justice
Series A, No. 10; 2 Hudson, Worid Court Reports 18 (1927).
" Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany v. Hrenecek, U.S. Court of the
Allied High Commission for Germany, Crim. 52-A5-486, Leo M. Goodman, Presiding U.S.
Judge, Area 5 (26 May 1954). In the course of the expulsion of the two-and-one-half
million Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia, in the spring of 1945, several hundred
thousand persons were arrested and interned in Czechoslovakian concentration camps. Of
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constitutes a violation of International Law. No country has ever pro-
tested against the practice of Italy, Germany and other nations of pro-
ceeding against a foreign resident in exactly that way which was de-
clared to be inadmissible by the Supreme Court of the United States
the persons subjected to these measures some were nationals of Germany and others of the
Czechoslovak Republic. In several of the camps inmates were brutally beaten, tortured, or
killed. Between May 1945 and November 1946, Vaclav Hrenecek, a Czechoslovak police
officer, was Deputy Commander of the Internment Center at Budweis, Czechoslovakia,
where, during his term of office, numerous inmates were cruelly abused, in some cases with
death resulting. In the proceedings subsequently prosecuted against him, Hrenecek was
found not only not to have prevented such maltreatment of prisoners, but in several cases
to have ordered, and also to have actively participated in, it. In the spring of 1949, Hrene-
cek, in order to escape prosecution by the Communist government of Czechoslovakia, fled
to Germany. He was recognized by former inmates of the Budweis concentration camp,
arrested by the German police, and charged before the District Court No. I in Munich, a
regular court of the Federal Republic of Germany, with having committed numerous acts
of criminal assault as defined in § 223 of the German Criminal Code. The prosecution was
based upon this Section of the German Criminal Code in conjunction with § 4 of the Ger-
man Criminal Code, and § 1 of Law No. 108, dated 28 June 1933, of the Czechoslovak
Republic.
Section 4 of the German Criminal Code reads as follows: "The German Criminal Law
shall apply to an alien for an offense committed abroad, if the act also is a punishable
offense under the law of the place where it was committed, . . . provided the offense was
directed against a German national."
Since the accused at the time of his arrest had been in the employ of the U.S. Armed
Forces in Germany, and thus was to be regarded as a member of the Allied Forces within
the meaning of High Commission Law No. 2, the U.S. High Commissioner, upon the basis
of Article 1 (a) of Allied High Commission Law No. 13, and Art. 1 of U.S. High Commis-
sioner Law No. 6, ordered that the case be transferred from the German Court in Munich
to the U.S. Court of the Allied High Commission for Germany, Area 5 (Munich). While
applying its own procedural law, this Court applied the same substantive law that would
have been applied by a German court. Having found Hrenecek guilty of the offences
charged, the Court sentenced him to eight years imprisonment in a German penitentiary.
Judge Goodman's elaborate opinion contains a remarkable discussion of the problem of
whether or not the provision of § 4 of the German Criminal Code is compatible with In-
ternational Law. He convincingly demonstrates that International Law does not forbid a
country to punish an alien for a crime which he has committed abroad against a national,
or against the national interest, of that country, if it succeeds in arresting him within its
own territory.
The extent of jurisdiction to punish for crime has been widely discussed, especially in
connection with the Lotus case (note 93 supra). The literature is collected and discussed
in Harvard Research in International Law, Jurisdiction over Crime, 29 Am. J. Int. L.
Supp. 439 (1935). Of special interest is the Report on Extraterritorial Crime and the Cut-
ting Case, U.S. Foreign Relations, 1887, written by John Bassett Moore in his capacity as
a State Department officer. In the Cutting case the United States protested against the
act of the Mexican government which had prosecuted and convicted of criminal libel an
American citizen, Cutting, whose allegedly criminal activities had been carried on within
the territory of the United States. The American protest was rejected by the Mexican gov-
ernment, which maintained in its reply that every nation has the right to hold foreigners
"responsible for acts they may commit abroad against that nation, or against any of its
citizens or subjects." (See 2 U.S. For. Rel.: 1888, at p. 1114; 2 Moore, International Law
240.) Sitting as a judge of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Lotus case,
Mr. Moore objected to the claim of Turkish jurisdiction insofar as it was to be based
exclusively upon the Turkish nationality of the victim.
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when it had been applied by Oregon against a resident of CaliforniaW 5
No protest has been lodged either, against the English and American
claims of jurisdiction over a mere transient on whom the sheriff suc-
ceeds in serving a summons while he happens to change ships or planes
in an American port.96 No rule of International Law prevents the Mexi-
can state of Chihuahua from granting mail order divorces to people
who have never come near Chihuahuan soil, nor would any rule, it
seems, stand in the way of some other enterprising country rendering
its courts available for the issuance of default money judgments against
anyone in the whole world.97 Of course, no other country would en-
force such a judgment, least of all the country of the defendant's resi-
dence. But if in some way the defendant should happen to acquire
property in the country by whose court the judgment was rendered,
International Law could hardly be said to be violated when such prop-
erty is attached in execution of the judgment. No country has so far
embarked on such a course nor is any country likely to do so. All coun-
tries have, indeed, adopted rules by which they have established some
territorial limits to the exercise of their governmental powers by their
courts and other officers and agencies. In the United States we do not
generally prosecute acts committed by foreigners abroad and our
courts do not render default judgments in personam against non-resi-
dents, nor do we undertake to levy upon a resident a tax measured by
the value of a piece of land situated abroad. In similar, although not
necessarily identical, ways, foreign countries have limited the ter-
ritorial scope of the exercise of their governmental powers. But these
limitations are established not by International Law but by every
country's own internal law, by which they can be expanded or re-
strained in any way that may be deemed fit by the law-making agencies
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). Section 23 of the German Code of Civil Proce-
dure provides as follows: "An action for the payment of money or any other claim of
money's worth against a person who has no residence in Germany, may be brought in the
court of any district within which such person owns any property."
" See Peabody v. Hamilton, 106 Mass. 217 (1870): The defendant was a non-resident
en route from Nova Scotia to New York. Service was made on him while he was on board
a British mail steamer in Boston Harbor. The jurisdiction of Massachusetts was upheld
by the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth.
Fisher v. Fielding, 67 Conn. 91, 34 AtI. 714 (1895): Suit in Connecticut to enforce an
English judgment. The jurisdiction of the English courts was based upon service on an
alien transiently stopping in an English hotel. The English jurisdiction was upheld.
See also Bowman v. Flint, 37 Tex. Civ. App. 28, 82 S.W. 1049 (1904), and Harris v.
Balk, 198 U. S. 215 (1904).
' Cf. Rheinstein, Die inliindische Bedeutung einer ausliindischen Zwangsvollstreckung in
Geldforderungen, 8 Zeitschrift fiir auslhindisches und internationales Privatrecht 277 (1934).
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of the country in question.
Whenever the court or administrative agency of a country pro-
nounces a decree or other act which purports to bring about legal effects
in another country, the act remains an empty gesture insofar as it is
not "recognized" by the other country. If a Canadian court renders a
money judgment against a defendant who has the bulk of his property
in the United States, the judgment is of little value to the victorious
party unless execution upon it can be had in the United States. A Mexi-
can mail order divorce is of doubtful value to American parties if, on
remarriage, they are jailed for bigamy by their American state of resi-
dence. The United States Code of Internal Revenue which imposes an
income tax on all income earned abroad by a citizen of the United
States98 remains a dead letter against a citizen who has no property
within the United States and lives in a country which will not help the
United States enforce its tax claim. The provision of the Italian Crim-
inal Code which threatens with punishment the foreigner who any-
where in the world cheats, steals from, or bodily injures, an Italian
citizen,99 is ineffective against one who neither comes into Italy nor
owns any property there.
If an Italian court has to determine the intrinsic validity of a mar-
riage entered into by a national of Italy, it is by its Code ordered to
apply Italian law even though the marriage was celebrated in the
United States by an Italian residing there.100 An American court, on the
other hand, will apply American law to the marriage of residents of
the United States celebrated in the United States even though the parties
were citizens of Italy.' 0 If an Italian national declared by Italian law
to be incapable of concluding a contract makes a contract in a state
of the United States where a person of his qualifications has full con-
tractual capacity, an Italian court will apply Italian law and declare
the contract invalid, 02 while an American court will apply American
law and declare the contract valid. 0 3
It is apparent from these illustrations that countries frequently claim
for themselves a scope of jurisdiction which is broader than that which
other countries are willing to concede to them. Frequently a country
may even claim for itself a jurisdiction broader than that which it is
ready to concede in others. By internal English law, it is declared that
' Consult U.S. Code of Internal Revenue, 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 861 et seq. (1952).
'Italian Penal Code of 1930, Art. 10. "Rest. Conflict of Laws § 121 (1934).
" Italian Civil Code of 1942, Art. 17. "o Italian Civil Code of 1942, Art. 17.
' Rest. Conffict of Laws § 333 (1934) ; Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374 (1878).
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under certain circumstances an English court may render a default
money judgment against a non-resident. But when a French court
rendered a default judgment against a non-resident Dane, execution
could not be obtained against the defendant's assets in England. 104 Just
as it is up to every country to determine the extent to which it wishes
to exercise jurisdiction "extraterritorially," so it is left under present
day International Law to determine for itself to what extent it will
"recognize" the jurisdiction of another country, i.e., the extent to which
it will give effect or, what is the same, "faith and credit" to the legisla-
tive, judicial or administrative acts of another country's agencies. 0 5 In
other words, conflict of laws is regarded at present as constituting a
subject matter of purely national regulation to be established and
elaborated by every nation freely for itself." 6 This national character
applies to conflicts law in all its branches: determination of the scope
of jurisdiction of the country's own courts and administrative agencies;
scope of recognition of foreign judgments and other governmental acts;
scope of the country's own criminal and tax laws; and also, and quite
particularly, scope of application of the country's own, as well as every
other country's, laws on problems of private law. Voluntarily, a country
may bind itself by treaty to regulate its judicial, legislative, taxing,
criminal or administrative jurisdiction in some particular way. Apart
from treaty, prevailing present day opinion regards every nation as
free to determine its conflicts law in accordance with its own notions
of justice, policy, practicability, tradition, or legal technics.10 7 The only
limit generally recognized is the principle which we have already men-
tioned by which it is forbidden to the officers of any state to perform an
act of state power upon the territory of another.
"' Schibsby v. Westenholz, L.R., 6 Q.B. 155 (1870).
' While in the United States as well as in the United Kingdom and in the other Com-
monwealth countries foreign judgments are readily recognized, provided the country of the
forum had jurisdiction according to Anglo-American notions, recognition is withheld as a
general rule by France, The Netherlands and numerous other countries. An intermediate
position is occupied by such countries as Germany, Italy or Austria, where foreign judg-
ments are recognized under certain conditions, especially that of reciprocity. It has never
been claimed that the French position of generally refusing recognition of foreign judg-
ments would violate any command of International Law. On the enforcement of foreign
judgments see Lorenzen, The Enforcement of American judgments Abroad, 29 Yale L. J.
188 (1919) ; League of Nations, Report of a Committee of European Jurists on the En-
forcement of Foreign Judgments (1925), repr. 21 DI. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1926).
" Cf. Nussbaum, Rise and Decline of the Law-of-Nations Doctrine in the Conflict of
Laws, 42 Col. L. Rev. 189 (1942).
' 1 Rabel, Conflict of Laws 9 (1945) ; Cheatham, Sources of Rules of Conflict of Laws,
89 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 430 (1941).
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2. In the situation just described it would seem to be impossible to
maintain the view which we have asserted above, viz., that the rules by
which the jurisdiction of the several states of the United States is
subjected to spatial limitations are derived from the Law of Nations
and that in such sense the Law of Nations has been incorporated in the
full faith and credit clause of the Constitution of the United States. The
answer lies in the fact that since the making of the Constitution the
term Law of Nations has assumed a new meaning and that we must
imply into the Constitution not the International Law of the mid-twen-
tieth century, but the Law of Nations as it was understood in the late
eighteenth century. In his book, Politics and the Constitution, Professor
William Crosskey has shown that the difficulties and alleged absurdi-
ties of the full faith and credit clause evaporate if we read it in this
way. 08 This view of his, which is based upon his extensive investiga-
tion of the process by which the Constitution of the United States was
made, is confirmed not only by that survey of cases which we have
presented above, 09 but also by the general history of the use and mean-
ing of the term "Law of Nations."
The term International Law is of comparatively recent origin. It
seems to have been invented by French writers of the early 19th cen-
tury as a synonym of the older term "Law of Nations," which, in turn,
was a translation of the Latin term ius gentium."0 This term has had
a long history. It was coined by the jurists of ancient Rome, who dis-
tinguished between those legal rules and institutions which were pecul-
iar to their own city and citizens, and those which they observed, or
believed to observe, as being common to all peoples alike. The former
they called ius civile, and the latter ius gentium."' The distinction was
' Politics and the Constitution 541 et seq., 563 et seq. (1953).
'Authorities discussed p. 793 et seq. supra.
1o Cf. Radin, Ius gentium, 8 Enc. Soc. Sd. 502, and bibliography, at p. 504 (1st ed.,
1932).
1 Gaius, Institutes 1 §1. "Omnes popull, qui legibus reguntur, partim suo proprio, par-
tim communi omnium hominum jure utuntur; nam quod quisque populus ipse sibi ius
constituit, idipsius propria est vocaturque ins civile, quasi proprium civitatis; quod vero
naturalis ratio inter homines constituit, id apud omnes populos peraeque custoditur, vo-
caturque ius gentium, quasi quo iure omnes gentes utuntur. Populus itaque Romanus par-
tin suo proprio, partim communi omnium hominum iure utitur." (All peoples which are
governed by laws and customs, make use partly of their own law and partly of that which
is common to all men. That law which each people has constituted for itself is its own
proper law and is called "ius civile" as it is proper of that particular political community
(civitas). That law, however, which natural reason has established among all men, is ob-
served among all peoples everywhere and is called "ins gentium" because of that law all
peoples make use. Hence the Roman people make use partly of their own proper law, and
partly of that which is the common law of all men.)
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of more than purely theoretical character. The agencies by which legal
disputes were decided between citizens in accordance with the ius
civile, i.e., the city praetor (praetor urbanus) and the lay judges ap-
pointed by him for each individual case, had no jurisdiction in disputes
between peregrines, i.e., citizens of city states or kingdoms other than
Rome, or even between a Roman citizen and a peregrine. When Rome,
in the period of the late republic, became the center of trade of the
Mediterranean world, machinery had to be provided for the decision
of such disputes. A special magistrate, the praetor of the peregrines
(praetor peregrinus), came to be invested with jurisdiction, but in the
cases which were brought before him, it was not possible to apply the
ius civile, which was the special privilege of citizens. There was thus
developed a set of laws which was believed to express those rules and
institutions which were common to all peoples everywhere. In this
way Rome developed a system of uniform law of universal application,
the existence of which made it unnecessary to develop any rules of con-
flict of laws in the sense of rules indicating whether a given case should
be decided under the law of one state rather than another. The situa-
tion resembled that which existed in the United States in the one-hun-
dred-year period between the Supreme Court's decisions in Swift v.
Tyson'1 2 and Erie Railroad v. Tompkins."3 Litigation between citizens
of a place would be decided under the ius civile of that particular place;
but "diversity 'of citizenship cases" would be handled under a law of
uniform validity.
In Rome, the distinction between ius civile and ius gentium lost much
of its practical significance when, in the period of the classical jurists,
disputes between citizens came to be decided by rules derived from
ius gentium, and Roman citizenship was extended to practically all
the free inhabitants of the Empire." 4 However, the distinction be-
tween ius civile and ius gentium continued to be stated in the writings
of the jurists and thus came to appear in the Corpus Juris in which
these writings were collected." 5 When the Corpus Juris had been re-
discovered in medieval Italy, the term ius gentium came to lend itself
as a convenient device for the development of ideas which had become
necessary in connection with far-reaching developments on the polit-
"516 Pet. (U.S.) 1 (1842). - 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
'"This process is usually regarded as having been made complete by the Constitutio
Antoniniana of Emperor Caracalla, issued in 212 A. D.; recent literature on this much dis-
cussed enactment is listed by Jrs and Kunkel, R6misches Privatrecht 57 (3d ed., 1949).
' Cf. Ulpianus, D. 1.1.1.; Inst. 1, 2, 1-2.
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ical scene. In the medieval view national states did not occupy that
dominating position which they hold today. Christendom was a hier-
archically organized unit under God, whose lieutenants on earth were
the Pope and the Emperor. Whether these potentates were of equal
rank or whether the Emperor was subordinate to the Pope, constituted
one of the fateful controversies of the times. Another controversy re-
lated to the relations between the Emperor -and the kings of such ter-
ritories as England, France, Sicily or Castile, who were practically
independent of him. As to the law, the Middle Ages were characterized
by the immense variety of customs of various localities and personal
groups. But when comprehensive juristic theories were developed, the
idea took hold that a law common to all Christendom was standing
behind all the various local and group customs, a law which could be
resorted to in that ever increasing number of cases for which the
customs and statutes had no answers, but which also was the law
which was concerned with legal relations and transactions transcend-
ing the spheres of any single unit of local or group statute or custom.
Upon the rediscovery of the law of the Corpus Iuris Civilis a tendency
arose to identify the common law of Christendom with the Roman
Law, the general authority of which was sought to be based upon
the claim of the emperors of the Holy Empire of Germanic Nation to
be the direct successors of the Roman caesars. The clash of this theory
with the factual independence from the Empire of the local kings and
the Italian city states was sought to be bridged by such propositions
as that which declared each king, and quite particularly that of France,
to be emperor within his kingdom. From the late 13th century on, the
impotence of the Empire as such, its transformation into the national
state of the Germans, and the establishment of the other kingdoms as
independent nations became so obvious, that the claim of general au-
thority of a common law of Christendom as imperial law became unten-
able. But the idea that such a law existed was far from being ex-
tinguished. The source of its authority was now found in its foundation
in divine ordination and nature, as well as in the ancient notion of a
ius gentium as "the law of which all men make use in common." In this
ius gentium the rules were found for the relations of rulers and nations
to each other, including those which would limit their proper spheres
of jurisdiction. But there were also found in the ius gentium the rules
for those activities of men which by their nature transcend the bound-
aries of a single nation, such as shipping and the activities of the
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merchants insofar as they do not pertain to purely local business.
In both respects the Middle Ages have given the opportunity for the
development of bodies of rules which were more or less uniform
throughout Christendom. When Europe had recovered from the catas-
trophe of the collapse of the Roman Empire, trade revived among all
its parts and assumed considerable proportions. Exchange was lively
not only for the products of different parts of Europe but also between
Europe and the East. The Crusades were waged not exclusively for
religious reasons. Those who were engaged in what we would nowadays
call international trade constituted one of those groups of people which
settled their controversies in their own courts and in them developed
their own sets of customs, which became known as the law merchant
and the law of the seas."' Clearly, the conception as to what these cus-
toms provided, varied in many a detail, but yet they were regarded to
be the same in all parts of Christendom, to be made use of by all na-
tions alike, and thus to be parts of the ius gentium. This ius gentium
was a felt reality in all Christendom; men acted in accordance with
it and writers concerned themselves both with the content of its various
parts and its general theory. Toward the very end of its long sway, in
the 17th and 18th centuries, the ius gentium or, as it was increasingly
called in England, the Law of Nations, was brought into a specially
close relationship with that Law of Nature in which the scholars of
the age of reason and enlightenment sought to find the ground and
foundation of all law.
Natural law ideas came to play a decisive role in the development of
that branch of the ius gentium which had become necessary with the
recognition of sovereignty of the several nations, i.e., that branch which
concerned itself with the legal rights and duties existing in the relation-
ships of the sovereign nations among themselves. It was this branch
to which the term Law of Nations and its later synonym finally came to
be limited. Throughout the 18th century and far into the 19th, the term
continued, however, to be used with its older, broader meaning. It is
also during that period that we find the terms ius gentium and Law of
Nations applied to that body of legal rules and principles which we
now call the "law of conflict of laws" or "private international law."
The very existence of the latter term, which is widely used in Eng-
land, 7 and whose counterparts in other languages constitute the prac-
, Cf. Sanborn, Law Merchant, 9 Enc. Soc. Sci. 270, and bibliography at 274 (1932).
C' f. the titles of the following treatises: Westlake (and Bentwich), Treatise on Private
International Law (7th ed., 1917); Foote (and Bellott), Private International Law (5th
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tically exclusive name of the field in other countries," 8 indicates that
it was once regarded as a part of International Law." 9
That the law of conflict of laws belongs to the ius gentium was ex-
pressly stated by that writer through whose work conflicts law be-
came introduced into England. 20 In the first paragraph of the chapter
entitled "On the conflict between the different laws in different realms"
Huber states:
It often happens that a transaction which is contracted in one place, is to have
effect in places of another realm, or that it will have to be adjudicated elsewhere.
It is known, however, that the laws and statutes of the several peoples differ in
many respects. Once the provinces of the Roman empire were torn asunder, the
Christian world is divided in almost innumerable peoples, which are neither subject
to one another nor united in a common order or rule. In Roman law no rules ex-
isted, of course, on this matter because the empire of the Roman people extended
over all parts of the world and was governed by a uniform law. No conflicts be-
tween different laws could thus arise. It nevertheless seems that the basic rules by
which the decision of such matters must be determined must be derived from the
Roman law. However, the question belongs to the ins gentium rather than the ius
civile, because what different people must observe between each other, obviously
belongs to the field of ius gentium.
ed., 1925); Cheshire, Private International Law (4th ed., 1952); Phillimore, Commentaries
upon International Law, vol. 4, Private International Law (1889); Wolff, Private Inter-
national Law (2d ed., 1952) ; Schmitthoff, Textbook of the English Conflict of Laws (Pri-
vate International Law) (1945); Nelson, Selected Cases on Private International Law
(1889) ; Morris, Selected Cases of Private International Law (1940).
R Cf. 1 Rabel, Conflict of Laws 11 (1945).
'
1 This aspect is well illustrated by the existence of learned treatises which are generally
devoted to International Law and which are divided into two parts respectively dealing
with Public International Law and Private International Law; see, for instance, Phillimore,
Commentaries upon International Law (London, 1889) ; Diena, Principi di diritto inter-
nazionale (2d ed., 1917) ; Fedozzi e Romano, Trattato di diritto internazionale (1933).
Both branches of International Law are also treated in the Journal de droit interna-
tional [Clunet] (1874 et seq); Revue de droit international [Darras] (1905 et seq);
Rivista di diritto internazionale (1906 et seq) ; Zeitschrift fUr internationales Recht (1891-
1937); British Year Book of International Law (1920 et seq); International Law and
Comparative Quarterly [1947) (1952 et seq) ; Schweizerisches Jahrbuch filr internationales
Recht (1944 et seq) ; Recueil des cours de l'Academie de droit international (1923 et seq) ;
Annuaire de l'Institut de droit international (1875 et seq) ; Nordisk Tidskrift for interna-
tional Ret (1930 et seq); Nederlandsche Tijdschrift voor Internationaal Recht (1953 et
seq).
'Uricus Huberus, De conflctu legum diversarum in diversis imperiis (Of the Conflict
of Diverse Laws of Diverse Governments), constituting section 4 of title 3, part 2, book
1 of Huber's Praelectionum iuris civilis tomi tres. The book was first published in 1707.
The text follows the edition by Jodocus Plat, Louvain 1766. The full Latin text with Eng-
lish translation has been published by E. Lorenzen in 13 Ill. L. Rev. 375, 401 (1919),
repr. Sel. Articles on the Conflict of Laws 162 (1947). The Latin text can also be found in
Guthrie's edition of Savigny's Conflict of Laws (2d ed., Edinburgh, 1880, p. 508).
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The immense influence which Huber's work has had on conflicts law
in England and the United States is well known.' It may be directly
due to Huber's influence or, more probably, to the general climate of
the times, that English judges and writers also came to speak of con-
flict of laws problems as belonging to the field of ius gentium.22 In
1748, Lord Hardwicke declared a French decree establishing the
validity of a marriage to be conclusive "from the law of nations in
such cases."' 23 In 1752, Sir Edward Simpson pronounced in the Con-
sistory Court of London that by the ius gentium the validity of an
alleged marriage is to be determined by the law of the place where the
ceremony took place, and that a judgment of nullity rendered by a
court of that country must, also under the ius gentium, be given effect
in England.' 24 In 1760, Lord Mansfield declared that "the general
'On Huber's influence on the Anglo-American law of conflict of laws, see Lorenzen,
Huber's De conffictu legum, 13 I1. L. Rev. 375 (1919), repr. Sel. Articles on the Conflict
of Laws 136 (1947). It should be noted that as early as 1678 Lord Nottingham declared
that "It is against the law of nations not to give credit [note this phrase!] to the judgments
and sentences of foreign countries." Cottington's Case, cited in 2 Swan. 326, 36 E.R. 640.
In 1607 it was said that "It is by the law of nations that the justice of one nation will
be an aid to the justice of another nation, and the one execute a judgment of the other."
Wier's Case, 1 Rolle Abr. 530.
'A number of these cases have been surveyed by W. C. Cowles, Judicial Review in
Conflict of Laws, 21 Nordisk Tidskrift for International Ret 51 (1951).
'Roach v. Jurvan, 1 Ves. Sr. 157, 159, 27 E.R. 954 (1748). The references to this
case and to the cases cited in notes 121-4 were found in Professor Alexander N. Sack's au-
thoritative article on "Conflicts of Laws in the History of the English Law," 3 New York
University, School of Law, Law: A Century of Progress 342, 441, 449 (1937).
The full text of the passage cited is as follows: The marriage in question is "valid from
being established by the sentence of a court in France having jurisdiction, and it is true
that, if so, it is conclusive whether in a foreign court or not, from the law of nations in
such cases, otherwise, the rights of mankind would be very precarious and uncertain."
I Scrimshire v. Scrimshire, 2 Hag. Cons. 395, 417, 161 E.R. 782, 791 (1752). The
opinion contains the following passages, which all throw a significant light upon the juris-
prudential attitudes of the time: "All nations allow marriage contracts; they are 'luris gen-
tium'" (at 417). "As it is of consequence to the subjects of both countries, and to all
nations, that there should be one rule of determining in all nations on contracts of this
kind, it is to be presumed that all nations do consent to determine on these contracts, by
the laws of the country, where they are made .... In matters that belong to the ius gen-
tium, our Courts always regard the sentences of a proper Court" (at 419). "In commercial
affairs under the law merchant, which is the law of nations, there are instances where sen-
tences for or against contracts abroad have been given, and received here on trials, as
evidence, and have had their weight. And this has been allowed on a principle of the law
of nations, which all countries by consent agree to, for the sake of carrying on commerce
which concerns the public in general. There are instances of the same kind in the Court of
Admiralty; the sentences of all Courts of Admiralty are taken notice of by one another;
they are obligatory by the law of nations .... And as all countries are equally interested
to have matrimonial questions determined by the laws of the country where they are had,
and the mischief would be infinite to the subjects of all nations if it was not so; I am of
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rule, established ex comitate et iure gentium, is that the place where
a contract is made, and not where the action is brought, is to be con-
sidered in expounding and enforcing the contract."2 5 In 1769, Black-
stone wrote in the fourth volume of the Commentaries that "in civil
transactions and questions of property between the subjects of different
states, the law of nations has much scope and extent, as adopted by the
law of England."' 26 In America we find reference made to the Law of
Nations as the source of a state's obligation to pay regard to a foreign
law in a case which was before the Common Pleas, Philadelphia County
in 1786.127 In 1783, a judgment was entered against Allen in Penn-
sylvania. Later during the same year he was discharged from "all his
debts" under the insolvency law of New Jersey. He thereupon moved
in the Pennsylvania court that its judgment be set aside. In support of
the motion his attorneys, Bradford and Lewis, referred to the Law of
Nations as requiring that the New Jersey discharge be recognized in
Pennsylvania. According to Dallas' report "they observed that by the
Law of Nations, every transaction, not yet completed, which has a view
to its completion in a foreign country, must be determined according
to the municipal law of that country." In support of this statement
reference is made to those pages of Blackstone's and Burrow's Reports
on which Robinson v. Bland12 8 is reported, and which must thus have
been known to the two Philadelphia lawyers.
Except the last, all these passages cited were published at dates pre-
ceding the date of both the Articles of Confederation and the Constitu-
tional Convention. They should suffice to indicate that among men
learned in the law of England it was a widely held opinion that it was
for the Law of Nations to determine to what extent foreign laws should
be applied, under what circumstances attention should be paid to
opinion that this is the ius gentium of which this and all courts take notice" (at 421).
"The law of the country, where the contract is made, seems to me, according to the law
of nations, to be the only rule of determining in these cases" (at 422).
'Robinson v. Bland, 1 W. Bl. 234, 256, 258, 96 Eng. Rep. 129, 141 (1760). The sen-
tence quoted in the text does not appear in the report of the case stated in 2 Burr. 1077,
97 Eng. Rep. 717. According to the report in 1 W. Bl. 234, 237, Blackstone, appearing for
the defendant, argued that: "From mutual commerce and intercourse, which will quickly
follow, arises the necessity not only of a law of nations to regulate that commerce and
intercourse, but also of communicating in some degree with the law of other countries,
in respect to the contracts of individuals."
1 4 Commentaries 68; in the passage which is cited in 2 Crosskey, Politics and the
Constitution 1260, Blackstone goes on to say that he is not to pursue the topic in the
given context.
I James v. Allen, 1 Dallas 188 (Pa. C.P., 1786), cited by Crosskey, op. cit. supra
n. 108 at 549, 1337.
12 1 Blackstone's Reports 234 (2d ed., 1828) ; 2 Burrow's Reports 1077 (5th ed., 1812).
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foreign judgments, and what effect should be ascribed to them. It is
thus no wonder that after the adoption of the Constitution of the
United States we find it stated that under the full faith and credit
clause the duty of a state to give effect to the judgment of a sister state
is no greater than it had been before the Constitution under the Law
of Nations.'29 It is interesting in that respect that in the Pennsylvania
case just cited as well as in a case decided two years later 30 the scope
of the duty to honor the foreign discharge of an insolvent debtor under
the full faith and credit clause of the Articles of Confederation was un-
controvertedly alleged to be coextensive with that existing under "the
general principle of the law of nations."
To the effect that jurisdiction is determined by the Law of Nations, no
less an authority than Chief Justice Marshall also expressed himself
when he said, in Rose v. Himely:1 1
Of its own jurisdiction, so far as it depends on municipal rules, the court of a
foreign nation must judge, and its decision must be respected. But if it exercises
a jurisdiction which, according to the law of nations, its sovereign could not confer,
however available its sentence may be within the dominion of the prince from
whom the authority is derived, they are not regarded by foreign courts. This dis-
tinction is taken upon the principle, that the law of nations is the law of all tri-
bunals in the society of nations, and is supposed to be equally understood by all.132
The doctrines of jurisdiction are a part of the Law of Nations in the
comprehensive sense in which this term was once understood, and in
this sense they have become a part of our constitutional law. In this
sense, they have been understood by the early judges as well as by the
writers.
In his Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws,133 Judge Story wrote
on the full faith and credit clause:
The constitution did not mean to confer any new power upon the states; but
simply to regulate the effect of their acknowledged jurisdiction over persons and
things within their territories.' 34
Cf. Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. 462, 467 (1813), per Parsons, C. J.: "Neither our own
statute, nor the federal constitution, nor the act of congress had any intention of en-
larging, restraining, or in any manner operating upon the jurisdiction of the legislatures,
or of the courts of any one of the United States. The jurisdiction remains as it was before."
30Miller v. Hall, 1 Dallas 248 (Supr. Ct. of Pa., 1788).
14 Cranch (U.S.) 241, 276-7 (1808).
'In connection with the second sentence of the passage quoted, what has been said
before should make it clear that the passage is not limited to judgments rendered by the
courts of foreign nations.
"3 1st ed., 1834.
'"At 509, n. 2, Story refers to his "Comment on the Constit. ch. 29, S 1297 to 1307
(1833), and cases there cited;-Hall v. Williams, 6 Pick. R. 237; Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass.
462; Shumway v. Stillman, 6 Wend. R. 447; Evans v. Tarleton, 9 Sergt. and R. 260;
19ss]
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In Story's thought, the states' "acknowledged jurisdiction over per-
sons and things within their territories" is derived from those "General
Maxims of International Jurisprudence" which are presented in Chap-
ter II of the book, and "without the express or tacit admission of
which," he asserts that "it will be found impossible to arrive at any
principles to govern the conduct of nations, or to regulate the due ad-
ministration of justice."'13 5
That both jurisdictional limitations and the law of conflict of laws
are derived from the Law of Nations is also stated in Judge Cooley's
Constitutional Limitations.3 6 In the order of ideas of Story, he asserts
that "the legislative authority of every state must spend its force with-
in the territorial limits of the State. The legislature of one State can-
not make laws by which people outside the State must govern their
actions, except as they may have occasion to resort to the remedies
which the State provides, or to deal with property situated within the
State .... Upon the principles of comity, however, which is a part of
the law of nations, recognized as such by every civilized people, effect
is given in one state or country to the laws of another in a great variety
of ways."M 3
7
The same kind of thought is found in as late a work as The Consti-
tution of the United States' by W. W. Willoughby, who has this to
say in the chapter entitled "Interstate relations; full faith and
credit":
Except as otherwise specifically provided by the Federal Constitution, the
States of the American Union, when acting within the spheres of government re-
served to them, stand toward one another as independent and wholly separated
States. The laws of each State have no force, and its officials have no public author-
ity, outside of the State's territorial boundaries. As to all these matters, their rela-
tions inter se are governed by the general principles of Private International Law
or, as otherwise termed, the Conflict of Laws. It may also be said that the terri-
torial character of the quasi-sovereignty of the States are determined by the ac-
cepted principles of general public or international law. Thus, as will presently be
pointed out, a State of the Union is without the jurisdiction; not because of Federal
Benton v. Burgot, 10 Sergt. and R. 240; Hancock v. Barrett, 1 Hall Sup. Ct. R. 155;
S. C. 2 Hall Sup. Ct. R. 302; Wilson v. Niles, 2 Hall Sup. Ct. R. 358; Hoxie v. Wright,




Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 248 et seq. (8th ed., 1927) (italics added). Note
that judge Cooley does not distinguish between interstate and international problems.
I Willoughby, The Constitution of the United States (1929).
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constitutional limitations, but by reason of a limitation of its territorial sovereignty,
as fixed by general Anglo-American jurisprudential principles, to enforce the penal
acts of a sovereignty other than its own, to enter personal judgments against per-
sons who have not been personally served within the State, or to determine titles to
lands outside the State, or to grant a divorce to non-domiciled petitioners.13 9
The transition, not to a new line of thought, but rather to a dif-
ferent terminology, is expressed in the following passage from the
Treatise of the Law of Conflict of Laws by Beale, in whose order of
ideas the concept of jurisdiction played a dominant role. On its bases,
he had this to say:
274. Jurisdiction, as the word is here used, is the power of a state to create rights
such as can be recognized by other states as valid; it is a common conception of all
nations, but the rules for determining it are to some extent different in states
governed by the civil law than in those governed by the common law.
275. Jurisdiction, then, is fixed by the common law, but the principles so estab-
lished, unlike other principles of the common law, are incapable of change by stat-
ute. They can be changed only by the slow process of change of legal thought
which alone can alter the general system of the common law, or by the concurrent
act of the states concerned. 140
Outside of its historical context, this brief statement may not appear
to be very helpful. But if we view it in connection with the long his-
torical development, we can take it as an expression of the same thought
which underlies all these statements of judges and writers in which
the Law of Nations, in the sense of ius gentium, is applied to the prob-
lem of limiting from each other the proper spheres of governmental ac-
tivity of the states of the American Union. The problem is that of find-
ing the right way in which these states can harmoniously coexist within
that Union so that each can pursue and fulfill its aims and purposes
without hampering the corresponding aims and purposes of every
other. This thought has been aptly expressed by Mr. Justice Frank-
furter, when he said, in Williams v. North Carolina:
Under our system of law, judicial power to grant a divorce-jurisdiction, strictly
speaking-is founded on domicil. Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175; Andrews v. Andrews,
188 U.S. 14. The framers of the Constitution were familiar with this jurisdictional
prerequisite, and since 1789 neither this Court nor any other court in the English-
speaking world has questioned it. Domicil implies a nexus between person and place
of such permanence as to control the creation of legal relations and responsibilities
of the utmost significance.
To permit the necessary finding of domicil by one State to foreclose all States
in the protection of their social institutions would be intolerable. But to endow
each State with controlling authority to nullify the power of a sister State to grant
a divorce based upon a finding that one spouse had acquired a new domicil within
19s5]
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the divorcing State, would, in a proper functioning of our federal system, be equally
indefensible .... The necessary accommodation between the right of one State to
safeguard its interest in the family relation of its own people and the power of an-
other State to grant divorces can be left to neither State .... The rights that belong
to all States and the obligations which membership in the Union imposes upon all,
are made effective because this Court is open to consider claims such as this case
presents, that the courts of one State have not given full faith and credit to the
judgment of a sister State that is required by Article IV, §1 of the Constitution.1 41
Safeguarding the proper functioning of the community of nations
has been the function of the Law of Nations and, within it, the law of
conflict of laws.1 " Safeguarding the proper function of the community
of states of the United States is the function of our present law of con-
flict of laws. Through the medium of the full faith and credit clause
our law of conflict of laws has been connected with the ancient ius gen-
tium which still lives in the Constitution to give the Supreme Court of
the United States the power to make workable the otherwise unwork-
able full faith and credit clause.
3. There only remains the question of how it was possible that
the ancient meaning of the term Law of Nations, and the fact of its
incorporation into the full faith and credit clause could be forgotten. 3
To some extent the explanation can be found in that process of re-
strictive transformation of the Constitutional powers of the federal
government which constitute the subject matter of Mr. Crosskey's work
and which he has promised to describe in detail in those volumes
which are still to come.1 4 However, the phenomenon is also connected
-325 U.S. 226, 229, 232-3 (1945).
1 Cf. Savigny, Private International Law, Guthrie's transl. 69-70 (2d ed., 1880): Our
"standpoint... is that of an international common law of nations having intercourse with
one another, and this view has in the course of time always obtained wider recognition,
under the influence of a common Christian morality, and of the real advantage which
results from it to all concerned. In this way we came to apply to the conflict of terri-
torial laws of independent states substantially the same principles which govern the col-
lision of particular laws in the same state."
1' That it was not entirely forgotten is indicated by the following language contained
in an opinion of as recent a date as 1917: "[The] rule [that a judgment in personam in
one state need not be credited in another without service of process on the defendant in
the first action] became established long before the adoption of the 14th Amendment, as
the result of applying fundamental principles of justice and the rules of international law
as they existed among the states at the inception of the government." Baker v. Baker,
Eccles & Co., 242 U.S. 394, 401 (1917).
14" "The present misconceptions are products, in the main, of the many attempts that
have been made throughout our history to distort the Constitution to serve some politi-
cal purpose. ... Other instances of forgotten meaning are to be explained, however, rather
upon the basis of prolonged disuse.... But the misunderstandings which are at once the
most important and the least suspected are those wherein there have been added to these
two factors of deliberate distortion and long disuse two other, purely fortuitous, elements
of the highest potency. One of these is the radically changed usage, at the present day,
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with a course of events of even farther reaching significance, viz., that
transformation of the world which has occurred in connection with the
rise of modern nationalism. It has been in the course of this develop-
ment that the terms Law of Nations and International Law have come
to assume their present narrow meaning, and that we have developed
the idea that, except for the rules regulating the conduct of sovereign
states toward each other, there can be no law other than that created
by some particular state or nation.1 45
This notion would not have been shared by lawyers and political
thinkers of the last two thousand years, who steadfastly adhered to
that view which was voiced by the classical Roman jurists that at
least some part of the law is common to all men. To Gaius this "law of
which all men make use" 46 appeared as dictated by natural reason, and
this view continued to be held far into modern times, when it reached
its culmination in the Natural Law school of the 17th and 18th
centuries.
Even today we may doubt whether it is really impossible even to
conceive of a law which is not the command of some particular sover-
eign or quasi-sovereign. Law ought, indeed, to have behind it "some
definite authority." But why shall it not suffice that this authority
through its courts, sheriffs and other enforcement officers backs the
enforcement of certain rules. Why should it not be possible that the
of certain words that constitute the key, not only to the meaning of important provisions
of the Constitution, but to the meaning of the eighteenth century pamphlet and news-
paper literature about it. The other is a somewhat comparable change in various basic
legal and political ideas which is not generally recognized to have occurred." Crosskey,
op. cit. supra n. 108, at 4.
' This view has been characteristically expressed in the following statement of Mr.
justice Holmes: "Books written about any branch of the common law treat it as a unit,
cite cases from this Court, from the Circuit Courts of Appeals, from the State Courts,
from England and the Colonies of England indiscriminately, and criticize them as right
or wrong according to the writer's notion of a single theory. It is very hard to resist
the impression that there is one august corpus, to understand which clearly is the
only task of any court concerned. If there were such a transcendental body of law
outside of any particular state but obligatory within it unless and until changed by
statute, the Courts of the United States might be right in using their independent
judgment as to what it was. But there is no such body of law. The fallacy and
illusion that I think exist consist in supposing that there is this outside thing to be found.
Law is a word used with different meanings, but law in the sense in which courts speak
of it today does not exist without some definite authority behind it." Black and White
Taxicab Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928).
The same thought has found even more striking expression in the often quoted remark
that "the common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articulate voice
of some sovereign or quasi-sovereign that can be identified." Southern Pacific Co. v.
Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917).
I" Gains, op. cit. supra n. 111.
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rules thus enforced have their source in some convictions, traditions
or customs which are common to the peoples and the courts of more
than one sovereign or quasi-sovereign? Holmes' view, which has re-
sulted in the far-reaching consequences of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tomp-
kins'4 7 reduces all "common law" to "law held in common.' 1 48
It has been in the course of this development that we have lost the
ability even to conceive of a law which is not the command of some
particular sovereign but rather a common law of supranational origin,
extent, and validity.14 9
The rise of the national states of Europe as sovereign nations can
be traced to the 13th century. But it took a long time until nationalism
could reach the strength to all but obliterate the feeling of unity that
once had permeated all Christendom. It required that long chain of
events which extends from the virtual collapse of the Holy Empire
in the 13th century over the religious split of the Reformation, the
substitution of the vernacular languages for the use of Latin and, later,
French, as the lingua franca of the educated classes, to the appeal to
nationalism through the French Revolution, the reaction to the Napo-
leonic conquests, the Romantic movement, 19th century imperialism,
the 20th century world wars, and the anti-colonialist movements of
recent decades. All these and many other events have contributed to
obliterate the old notion of the unity not only of the culture of Chris-
tendom but also of its law. It was in this course of events that law be-
1'7 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
'
45The distinction between "common law" (Gemeines Recht) and "law held in com-
mon" (Gemeinsames Recht) has long been made in continental legal theory. "Law held
in common" is law which, although enacted independently by the legislatures of several
jurisdictions, is expressed in the same words. Common law, on the other hand is law
which, based upon traditions, customs or convictions commonly shared is enforced by
the courts of several mutually independent jurisdictions, but regarded, because of its com-
mon origin, as one and the same system of law. "Laws held in common" are our uniform
state laws or, in Europe and Latin America, the uniform laws on bills of exchange and
checks enacted in the several countries in pursuance of the Geneva Conventions of 7 June
1930 and 19 March 1931. Common law, on the other hand, was the Roman law of the
Usus modernus as it was applied in the several German states before it was replaced on
the first of January, 1900, by the new German Civil Code. Cf. Enneccerus and Nipperdey,
Lehrbuch des biirgerlichen Rechts, Allgemeiner Teil (13th ed., 1931) § 41. I.
On the problem of the nature of the Common Law in the United States, see the acute
critique of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins by Helen Silving, Analogies Extending and Re-
stricting Federal Jurisdiction, 31 Iowa L. Rev. 330 (1946). See also Crosskey, op. cit.
supra n. 108, esp. chapters XVIII and XIX, and Rheinstein, Max Weber on Law in
Economy and Society 67 (1954).
1 See note 53 supra. Goebel's disagreement with Crosskey's finding that in the late
18th century the Common Law was regarded as common law, seems to be essentially
caused by the former's inclination even for the past to regard the Common Law as a
law held in common.
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came nationalized, in the double sense that in most nations local dif-
ferences of statutes and customs were wiped out, and that the notion
of a supranational common law was lost until nothing has been left of
it but a narrow field of International Law in the rigid modern sense.
Beyond this, nothing has survived except that reminiscence of a once
different state of affairs which appears in the name of Private Inter-
national Law,150 and some occasional reminiscence of the former unity
in the law of the seas. 5 '
In "Private International Law" the old idea that it was "inter-
national" in the sense of a supranational common law survived far
into the 19th century. But that idea vanished too, until conflicts law
was established as strictly national law on a par with any other field
of law.'Y2 In its present state the world has not only some one hundred
independent systems of substantive law but also of conflicts law. Any
lawyer engaged in international legal matters knows what this state
of affairs means.
In consequence of the United States Supreme Court's capitulation
before the Austinian theory of the law not being capable of having any
'See pp. 805-6 supra.
' Consult, for instance, The Belgenland, 114 U.S. 355 (1884): Claim for damages aris-
ing out of the collision on the high seas of a Belgian and a Norwegian ship. The plea
that the United States had no jurisdiction was refuted by Mr. Justice Bradley as follows:
"Although the court will use a discretion about assuming jurisdiction of controversies
between foreigners in cases arising beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the country to
which the courts belong, yet where such controversies are communis iuris, that is, where
they arise under the common law of nations, special grounds should appear to induce the
court to deny its aid to a foreign suitor when it has jurisdiction of the ship or party
charged."
On the substantive law, the Court expressed itself as follows: "As to the law which
should be applied in cases between parties, or ships, of different nationalities, arising on
the high seas, not within the jurisdiction of any nation, there can be no doubt that it
must be the general maritime law, as understood and administered in the courts of the
country in which the litigation is prosecuted."
This process of nationalization of the law of conflict of laws has been traced by
Nussbaum, Rise and Decline of the Law-of-Nations Doctrine in the Conflict of Laws,
42 Col. L. Rev. 189 (1942). According to Nussbaum, the law-of-nations theory of private
international law did both, arise and decline, during the 19th century. From the evidence
presented in this article, it will be clear that that theory had its rise long before the 19th
century. It is, indeed, as old as the law of conflict of laws itself, which was first developed
as a part of the Roman Common Law by the Italian Glossators of the 12th and the
Commentators of the 13th and 14th centuries, among whom Bartolus of Sassoferrato
appears as the most prominent cultivator of the field. The name Private International
Law may indeed have been used for the first time by Schaeffner, Entwicklung des Inter-
nationalen Privatrechts (1841) and Foelix, Droit international priv6 (1843). Consult
Nussbaum, op. cit. supra at 195, n. 25. But it is significant that in 1832 Story spoke of
ius gentium privatum, Story, Conflict of Laws, §§ 23-24 (2d ed., 1841). In his times, as
it had been before, the law of conflict of laws was a part of the ius gentium, i.e., the
Law of Nations.
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source other than the command of some particular sovereign,158 we are
now faced with an analogous situation within the United States. In
addition to the fifty-seven independent systems of state and territorial
laws we have been regaled to fifty-seven independent systems of con-
flicts law.' 54 But the ancient notion of a uniform common law in the
field has been too stubborn to die. In spite of the almost exclusive domi-
nance which the local law theory has obtained in this country, the
notion has persisted that the states' jurisdiction to tax, to decide con-
troversies and to regulate human conduct is in some way limited by a
law common and thus superior to all. Properly this notion has been
brought in contact with the full faith and credit clause of the Consti-
tution. Only, in exactly what way this connection could be achieved
could not be stated until the significance of the ancient ius gentium had
been rediscovered by Mr. Crosskey.
This discovery does not, of course, mean that we are presently
bound by those jurisdictional rules which were contained in the ius
gentium of 1787. We would, indeed, be hard put even to state what
in detail these rules were. What is significant is simply that at the time
of the making of the Constitution of the United States the idea ob-
tained that there existed a ius gentium in the sense of a legal order com-
mon to all Christendom and that this order imposed on all member
nations the duty so to confine their legislative, judicial and other
activities that all nations could live together in an orderly community.
This notion was, as we have seen, regarded as constituting a part of
the Constitution of the United States so that the member states could
live together in an orderly union. This notion has been made a part and
parcel of the full faith and credit clause, which would be meaningless
without it. It is in the full faith and credit clause that the Supreme
Court is to find the constitutional directive and authorization in detail
to determine the spatial confines by which the powers of the several
states are delimited against each other. It is also by the incorporation
of the idea of the existence of a ius gentium in the full faith and credit
clause that the Court must implement it so that the several states can
harmoniously live and operate together in the framework of the national
union. This foundation of the Supreme Court's power to define in
detail the limits of state jurisdiction to legislate, to adjudicate and to
tax is firm, and it is free from the doubts and troubles which had
"' Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
' Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941); Griffin v. McCoach,
313 U.S. 498 (1941).
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necessarily to arise whenever the Court tried to base its establishment
of jurisdictional limitations upon the due process clause. It is only
natural that all such attempts of the Court have been sporadic and
unco-ordinated. To what extent the concept of procedural due process
can be used for the purpose at all is doubtful, and resort to the concept
of substantive due process has been discredited. Besides, the due proc-
ess clause is meant to protect private persons against state power and
has nothing to do with the different task of harmoniously co-ordinating
within the federal union the competing and potentially conflicting
powers of the several states. The full faith and credit clause gives the
Supreme Court both the authority to perform this task and the policy
directive as to the end toward which this authority is to be exercised.
Only on such a basis is it possible to begin with the task to which Mr.
Justice Jackson has challenged "the scholarship of our profession," the
task of "finding wise answers on constitutional grounds to these ques-
tions.'M55
IV
The problem which has been raised by the case of Alton v. Alton'56
has led us to the investigation of a general problem of far reaching sig-
nificance. The specific problem of that case has not yet been answered,
however. It is this: what is the effect within its own state of a statute
in the enactment of which the state has overstepped the boundaries of
its jurisdiction; also, what is the effect within the state of enactment,
of a judicial decision rendered upon the basis of such a statute?
It is clear that a judgment is not only not entitled to full faith and
credit but also void at home when it was rendered so that it deprives
a person of life, liberty and property without due process of law. 1S 7
Equally void is a statute insofar as it orders or authorizes such a judg-
ment. But, as we have seen, a statute authorizing the granting of a
consent divorce does not deprive any person of life, liberty or prop-
erty."" Is such a statute void in the state of its enactment when it
authorizes the granting of divorces beyond the state's sphere of juris-
diction as determined by the Supreme Court for purposes of the full
faith and credit clause and when, consequently, a decree rendered
under the statute is not entitled to recognition in other states? Were
'Jackson, op. cit. supra n. 34, at 29.
S207 F. 2d 667 (C.A. 3d, 1953).
Pennoyer v. Neff, 99 U.S. 714 (1878).
'P. 780 supra.
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Jennings v. Jennings'6 9 and Alton v. Alton 6° decided correctly? The
answer does not follow automatically from the Supremacy Clause of
Article VI, Section 2 of the Constitution. We assume that it is presently
the "law of the land" that jurisdiction to grant a divorce does not be-
long to any state other than one in which at least one of the parties
resides.' 6' A decree of divorce rendered by any state other than that
of the residence of one of the parties need not be recognized by any
other. But is it void in the state by which it was granted? Even if we
were to say that by granting it the state has violated a constitutional
command, we must remember that not every legal act done in violation
of a prohibitory rule is void. The Romans aptly distinguished between
lex perfecta, lex imperfecta, and lex minus quam perfecta,'6 2 as we
distinguish between laws which are mandatory and others which are
directory only.Y63 Only in the case of the former is the act done in vio-
lation of it legally null and void. The conclusion of a contract may be
prohibited in the sense of being punishable, and yet be valid.16 The
' 251 Ala. 73, 36 So. 2d 236 (1948).
16-207 F. 2d 667 (CA. 3d, 1953). 'P1 pp. 775, 779 supra.
1" (1) Leges aut perfectae sunt aut imperfectae aut minus quam perfectae. Perfecta lex
est, quae vetat aliquid fieri, et si factum sit, rescindit; qua]is est lex. . . .Imperfecta lex
est, quae vetat aliquid fieri et, si factum sit, nec rescindit nec poenam iniungit ei, qui con-
tra legem fecerit; quais est lex Cincia, quae plus quam ... donari probibet, exceptis quis-
busdam personis velut cognatis, et si plus donatum sit, non rescindit. (2) Minus quam
perfecta lex est, quae vetat aliquid fieri, et si factum sit, non rescindit, sed poenam iniungit
ei, qui contra legem fecit; qualis est lex Furia testamentaria, quae plus quam mlle assium
legatum mortisve causa prohibet capere, praeter exceptas personas, et adversus eum, qui
plus ceperit, quadrupli poenam constituit." Tit. ex corp. Ulpiani 1, cited after Arangio-
Ruiz e Guarino, Breviarium Iuris Romani 445 (new ed., Milan 1951). [(1) Laws are
either perfect, or imperfect, or less than perfect. A perfect law is one which prohibits
something to be done and invalidates what has been done in spite of the prohibition. Such
for instance is (the rest of the passage has not been preserved). An imperfect law is one
which prohibits something to be done, but neither invalidates what has been done in spite
of the prohibition nor imposes any punishment upon the one who has acted against the
law. Of this kind is the lex Cincia, which prohibits that a donation be made beyond a
certain value to any person who is not excepted from that rule, such as certain relatives.
If a donation surpasses the amount, it is nevertheless valid. (2) A less than perfect law
is one which prohibits something to be done, does not invalidate what has been done
against the prohibition, but imposes punishment upon the one who has acted against
the law. Of this kind is the Lex Furia (concerning wills); it prohibits that anyone other
than certain persons receive a legacy of more than 1,000 asses, and imposes upon him
who has nevertheless accepted such a legacy, a penalty of four times the amount.]
" Cf. Lord Campbell in Liverpool Borough Bank v. Turner, 2 De G. F. & J. 502,
507-8 (1860): "No universal rule can be laid down for the construction of statutes, as to
whether mandatory enactments shall be considered directory only or obligatory with an
implied nullification for disobedience. It is the duty of courts of justice to try to get at
the real intention of the legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute
to be construed."
'14 Cf. Vita Food Products, Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co., [1939] A. C. 277, 293-94; John
E. Rasasco Creameries, Inc. v. Cohen, 276 N.Y. 274, 11 N.E. 2d 908 (1937).
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law prohibits the conclusion of various kinds of marriages, and yet may
treat such marriages as valid if they have been concluded neverthe-
less.165 A sovereign state may be prohibited by treaty or by a general
rule of International Law from enacting a statute of a certain kind, but
the statute enacted nevertheless is valid at least as far as the state's
own internal agencies are concerned.'66 Is the prohibition not to grant
divorces to any persons other than residents (and their spouses) of the
same character as such a rule of International Law?
At the outset we must recognize that a power to regulate legislative
and judicial jurisdiction includes the power to deprive an act of pro-
hibited exercise of jurisdiction of all legal effect. However, does the
federal regulation of state jurisdiction necessarily mean any more
than a release of the other states from the duty to give faith and credit
"Cf. Needam v. Needam, 183 Va. 681, 33 S.E. 2d 288 (1945) ; Meister v. Moore, 96
U.S. 76 (1877); Payne v. Payne, 54 App. D.C. 149, 295 Fed. 970 (1924).
'" Cf. Permanent Court of International justice, Germany v. Poland, Case of the Fac-
tory at Chorzow.
By a convention concluded in Geneva on 15 May 1922 [16 Martens, Nouveau recueil
g~n6al (3. ser.) 645], Poland had undertaken not to expropriate certain kinds of property,
owned by nationals of Germany and situated in that part of Upper Silesia which was
ceded by Germany to Poland under the Treaty of Versailles and the decision of the Con-
ference of Ambassadors, given in Paris on 20 October 1921. Under a law of the Polish
Diet, enacted on 14 July 1920 (Dziennik Ustaw 1920, no. 400), and extended to Polish
Upper Silesia by law of 16 June 1922 (Dziennik Ustaw 1922, no. 388), the Polish court
in Katovice decreed that title to certain industrial plants in Upper Silesia had vested in
the Polish Republic, and the government of the Polish Republic took over possession and
management of the factories. Germany applied to the Permanent Court of International
Justice to declare that by its measures Poland had violated the Geneva Convention of
May 15, 1922. The Court so found. In the course of the proceedings the Polish govern-
ment had objected to the power of the Court "to deal with the Polish law of July 14,
1920." To this objection, the Court replied as follows: "This . . . does not appear to be
the case. From the standpoint of International Law and of the Court which is its organ,
municipal laws are merely facts which express the will and constitute the activities of
States, in the same manner as do legal decisions or administrative measures." (judgment
No. 7, of 25 May 1926, Permanent Court of International Justice, Ser. A. No. 7, p. 4,
at p. 18; 1 Hudson, World Court Reports 521.)
When the Court had, by its judgment No. 7, declared that Poland, by enacting and
applying her laws of 1920 and 1922, had violated International Law as determined by the
Geneva Convention of 15 May 1922, Germany applied to the Court to order Poland to
pay an indemnity, and to fix the amount. In the course of these proceedings Poland main-
tained that no damage had been suffered because the Court in Katovice had held that,
upon the basis of the Polish statutes, the plant in question belonged to the Polish Re-
public. The Court passed over the objection by the following observation: "Whatever
the effect of the judgment... may be at municipal law, this judgment can neither render
inexistent the violation of the Geneva Convention recognized by the Court in Judgment
No. 7 to have taken place, nor destroy one of the grounds on which that judgment is
based." (judgment No. 13, of 13 September 1918, Permanent Court of International Jus-
tice, Series A, No. 13, p. 4, at p. 33; 1 Hudson, World Court Reports 667.)
The Court thus held in effect that International Law was violated precisely because
Poland had enacted a statute which was valid as far as Polish law was concerned.
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to the "offending" state's statute and judicial proceeding? Our tradi-
tion has been characterized by such tender regard for state's rights that
we cannot easily assume the existence of a grave limitation of state
power where the situation is sufficiently ambiguous to allow a milder
interpretation. What reason should there be for federal power to in-
validate the state's act as to its internal effects?
In the special context of divorce one must also remember that the
Supreme Court itself has ascribed a certain validity even outside of
the state where it was rendered to a decree of divorce in which the
jurisdictional fact of residence has been ascertained, although perhaps
erroneously, provided both parties have participated in the proceed-
ings.' 67 What reason could there thus be for applying the heavy sanc-
tion of invalidating as to its intra-state effects a statute extending a
state's claim to grant divorces which need not be given faith and credit
in other states? The only reason of which one might think is the in-
convenience which might accompany a so-called limping marriage,168
i.e., a marriage which is treated as existing in some state or states and
as not existing in others. If a decree of divorce rendered in state A
under circumstances analogous to those of Alton v. Alton is effective
in state A and not entitled to faith and credit in other states, the parties
are no longer husband and wife in state A, but may still be treated as
married to each other outside of that state. This situation would, in-
deed, be awkward, and, since the state A decree would not contain a
finding of residence, the awkward effect could not be eliminated by
the application of the rule of Sherrer v. Sherrer and Johnson v. Muel-
berger.0 9 But is that result so serious as to allow us to attach to a state
statute the grave sanction of nullity when it is not clearly compelled by
a rule of constitutional law? In consequence of the diversity of the laws
of different nations, limping marriages are by no means rare.'70 A hold-
ing that the statute is invalid would contradict the consistent line of
cases in which the Supreme Court has held that a state statute must be
treated as valid until its invalidity has been clearly demonstrated.' 7 '
' Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32 (1938) ; Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948) ; Coe v.
Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948); Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951).
"] Matrimonium claudicans. ' See authorities cited supra note 166.
" See 1 Rabel, Conflict of Laws 420-1 (1945).
' See O'Gorman and Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251, 257 (1931);
United States v. Caroline Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) ; Thomas v. Collins, 323
U.S. 516, 529 (1945); cf. Hamilton and Braden, The Special Competence of the Supreme
Court, 50 Yale L. J. 1319 (1941); Comments, 31 Col. L. Rev. 1136 (1931), 36 Col. L.
Rev. 283 (1936), 45 Ill. L. Rev. 274 (1950).
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It would also be contrary to the utterances of those Justices of the
Supreme Court who have addressed themselves to the problem. The
first occasion to do so arose in Haddock v. Haddock,'72 where it was
held that an ex parte divorce obtained in a state other than that of the
matrimonial domicile was not entitled to full faith and credit. As to the
effect of the decree in the state in which the divorce had been obtained,
Chief Justice White had this to say:
In view of the authority which government possesses over the marriage relation,
no question can arise on this record concerning the right of the State of Connecti-
cut within its borders to give effect to the decree of divorce in favor of the husband
by the courts of Connecticut, he being at the time when the decree was rendered
domiciled in that State.' 73
The Chief Justice also referred to the case of Maynard v. Hill'74 in
which the intra-state validity of the divorce granted by the legislature
of Washington was taken for granted although Washington was not
the matrimonial domicile as defined in Haddock v. Haddock.
The view expressed by Chief Justice White had already been ex-
pressed by Bishop,' 75 but was viewed sceptically by Professor Beale
in his article on Haddock v. Haddock Revisited 78 as well as in his
treatise on the Law of Conflict of Laws.
In Haddock v. Haddock it was clear that at least one of the parties
was a resident of the state where the divorce was granted, even though
that state was not at the time the matrimonial domicile. Williams
v. North Carolina 1177 was decided by the Court on the assumption
that the divorce plaintiffs had been residents of the divorcing state,
Nevada. In his dissent Mr. Justice Jackson did not regard it as
relevant whether or not the divorce plaintiffs were residents of
Nevada. He regarded the parties' ties with North Carolina as too strong
to compel that state to recognize the Nevada divorces. But he was
anxious to emphasize that such non-recognition would not detract from
the validity of the decrees for purposes of Nevada law. In this connec-
tion he said:
To hold that the Nevada judgments are not binding in North Carolina because
they are rendered without jurisdiction over the North Carolina spouses, it is not
necessary to hold that they are without any conceivable validity. It may be, and
17201 U.S. 562 (1906). -= Ibid., at 572.
125 U.S. 190 (1888).
'=2 Marriage and Divorce § 133 (6th ed. 1881): "If a court, under command of its
own government, takes a jurisdiction not rightful by the general principles of law as held
among civilized nations, its judgment will be binding at home, but null abroad."
'-39 Harv. L. Rev. 417 (1926). 177317 U.S. 287 (1942).
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probably is, true that Nevada has sufficient interest in the lives of those who so-
journ there to free them and their spouses to take new spouses without incurring
criminal penalties under Nevada law. I know of nothing in our Constitution that
requires Nevada to adhere to traditional concepts of bigamous union or the legiti-
macy of the fruit thereof. And the control of a state over property within its bor-
ders is so complete that I suppose Nevada could effectively deal with it in the
name of divorce as completely as in any other.17s
The same position was taken by the other dissenter, Mr. Justice
Murphy, who added that "there is an element of tragic incongruity in
the fact that an individual may be validly divorced in one state but not
in another. But our dual system of government and the fact that we
have no uniform laws on many subjects give rise to other incongruities
as well.)'1 9
In Williams v. North Carolina 11,180 when it had been found by the
North Carolina courts that none of the parties to the Nevada divorces
had been residents of that state, North Carolina was permitted to refuse
faith and credit to the Nevada decrees. The question of whether or
not these decrees were valid for purposes of Nevada was not taken up
in the opinion which was delivered for the Court by Mr. Justice Frank-
furter. 81 In his separate concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Murphy ex-
pressly declared Nevada entitled to grant divorces on whatever basis
it sees fit to all who meet its statutory requirements. "It is entitled,"
he continued, "moreover to give to its divorce decrees absolute and
binding finality within the confines of its borders."" Mr. Justice Rut-
ledge, also dissenting, emphasized that "the Court was careful not to
say that Nevada's judgment is not valid in Nevada' s3 and then stated
that "the necessary conclusion follows that the Nevada decree was
valid and remains valid within its borders."8 4
In Haddock v. Haddock,8 5 as well as in the two cases of Williams v.
North Carolina,' it was not necessary to decide whether or not a de-
cree of divorce which is not entitled to faith and credit outside of the
state where it was rendered, is valid within that state. The first case
in which this question was squarely raised before a federal court was
Sutton v. Leib.'8' 7 A resident of Illinois had obtained in Nevada a
1 Ibid., at 319. 'Ibid., at 311.
'°325 U.S. 226 (1945).
'It is hard to see how Mr. Justice Black could refer in his dissenting opinion to "the
Court's holding the Nevada decrees were void." Ibid., at 270.
Ibid., at 239. - Ibid., at 247.
Ibid., at 246. - 201 U.S. 526 (1906).
' 317 U.S. 287 (1942); 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
's 188 F. 2d 766, 768 (C.A. 7th, 1951).
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divorce which was held by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
not to be entitled to faith and credit outside of Nevada. However, the
party's remarriage in Nevada was nevertheless held to be valid because
for purposes of Nevada law the Nevada divorce was effective. 88
In contrast to this view of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit stands the decision of the Supreme Court of
Alabama in Jennings v. Jennings,'8 9 which declared invalid a statute
of Alabama,190 which had provided that it was unnecessary for the
plaintiff in an action for divorce to have been a bona fide resident of
the state for one year next before the filing of the bill "where the Court
has jurisdiction of the parties." " ' Under this statute it would have been
possible in Alabama to obtain a divorce for non-residents if the plain-
tiff submitted to personal jurisdiction by filing his bill in a court of the
state, and the defendant by entering an appearance. Considering the
Supreme Court cases in which it was said that residence of at least one
party is necessary to give a state jurisdiction to grant a divorce, the
Supreme Court of Alabama concluded that "the legislature of a state
cannot confer on the courts of that state a power which is not within
the power of the state to confer on the legislature." The Court failed
to consider that all the Supreme Court cases were exclusively concerned
with the problem of faith and credit to be ascribed to a decree of divorce
by a state other than that by whose court it was granted. The court
simply concluded that lack of jurisdiction was lack of jurisdiction with-
out considering that lack of jurisdiction can exist in one respect but not
in another. This kind of "lump concept thinking" has not only been
criticized by prominent legal scholars,'92 but has also been discarded
'The reversal of the decision by the Supreme Court, 342 U.S. 402 (1951), was based
upon other grounds and left unaffected the Court of Appeals' holding on the intra-Nevada
validity of the Nevada divorce.
' 2 5 1 Ala. 73, 36 So. 2d 236 (1948).
'o Compare text at p. 781 supra.
' General Acts 1945, p. 691, approved July 6, 1945. As amended by this Act, § 29,
Title 34, Code of 1940 was to read as follows: "When the defendant is a non-resident,
the other party to the marriage must have been a bona fide resident of this state for one
year next before the filing of the bill, which must be alleged in the bill and proved; pro-
vided, however, the provisions of this section shall not be of force and effect when the
Court has jurisdiction of both parties to the cause of action."
'See Llewellyn, Cases and Materials on the Law of Sales 561 (1930) ; W. IV. Cook
in 3 A. L. I. Proceedings 226-31 (1925); Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Con-
flict of Laws, c. Vii (1942). Bingham, The American Law Institute v. The Supreme
Court In the Matter of Haddock, 21 Cornell L.Q. 393 (1936). This last named article
states a refreshingly clear approach to the problem of divorce decrees not entitled to full
faith and credit. It has apparently influenced the Supreme Court in the case of Estin v.
Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
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by the Supreme Court in connection with the very problem of divorce,
when it held, in Estin v. Estin,193 that a decree of divorce could bring
about the dissolution of a marriage insofar as the parties to the marriage
were granted the freedom of remarriage, but leave unaffected the duty
of one of the parties to pay marital support to the other. In its opinion
in Alton v. Alton, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has
attempted a more careful and more discriminating justification of the
view that a decree of divorce which is not entitled to full faith and
credit is also invalid in the state in which it is rendered, and that a
statute purporting to authorize such a decree is invalid. However, the
basis of such invalidity is sought in the due process clause of the 14th
Amendment, a clause which, as we have seen, is not applicable unless
a person is being deprived of life, liberty or property. Since there can-
not be found any other clause of the Constitution from which the in-
validity of such a statute can be derived, it should, in accordance with
traditional policy, be held valid insofar as there are concerned its
binding effect upon the courts of the state of its enactment, and the
effects, within that state, of a decree rendered upon the basis of such
statute.
- 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
